These findings, from Pew Research’s new Political Typology survey, are consistent with past surveys showing public ambivalence about Wall Street. In April 2009, shortly after the financial meltdown, a large majority (63%) said that Wall Street made an important contribution to the economy, but about as many (67%) said that Wall Street cared only about making money for itself.

The Political Typology shows that views of Wall Street do not divide cleanly along partisan and ideological lines. Staunch Conservatives are strongly anti-government and pro-business; a large majority (72%) agrees with the Tea Party. Yet Staunch Conservatives express only modest support for Wall Street: 48% say it helps the economy more than hurts it, 39% say it hurts more than helps. (For detailed descriptions of all typology groups, see “Typology Group Profiles”).

The other core Republican group – Main Street Republicans – are more negative about Wall Street’s impact on the economy; just 36% say it helps more than it hurts, while 45% say the opposite. Main Street Republicans are socially and fiscally conservative, but are much more skeptical of business than are Staunch Conservatives.

The most positive opinions about Wall Street’s impact are seen among two groups in the middle of the typology. Majorities of Libertarians and Post-Moderns (56% each) say Wall Street helps the economy more than it hurts it. While Libertarians lean to the Republican Party, and Post-Moderns lean Democratic, both groups are well-educated and affluent.

In this regard, two of the most financially stressed groups in the typology – Hard-Pressed Democrats and Disaffecteds, Republican-leaning independents – are highly critical of Wall Street’s impact on the economy. Majorities of both groups say that Wall Street does more to hurt the economy (66% of Hard-Pressed Democrats, 59% of Disaffecteds).

Yet New Coalition Democrats, who also have relatively low family incomes but are financially optimistic, are divided: 39% say Wall Street helps the economy more than it hurts it, while 32% say it does more to hurt the economy.

Solid Liberals, who are strongly pro-government and critical of business, express negative views of Wall Street. About six-in-ten (59%) say that Wall Street does more to hurt the economy, while 32% say it helps the economy more than hurts it.

Different Views of Business Profits

Many of the typology groups express very different opinions about business than they do about Wall Street. On the question of business profits, 54% of the public says that businesses make too much profit, while 39% say that most corporations make a fair and reasonable profit.

Staunch Conservatives, who express mixed views of Wall Street, overwhelmingly see corporate profits as reasonable (by 78% to 13%). But Main Street Republicans are highly critical of corporate profits; 58% say businesses make too much profit, while only about a third (34%) say most corporations make a fair profit.

The predominant view among Libertarians, like Staunch Conservatives, is that business profits are fair and reasonable (83%). But Post-Moderns, who express positive views of Wall Street, are more skeptical about corporate profits; a narrow majority (52%) says that profits are excessive while 41% see them as fair and reasonable.

Just as New Coalition Democrats are less negative about Wall Street than are other financially stressed groups, so too are they less critical of corporate profits. Fewer than four-in-ten (38%) say that businesses make too much profit, only about half the percentages of Hard-Pressed Democrats (79%) and Disaffecteds (73%) who say this.

Solid Liberals, who are critical of Wall Street’s impact, are even more critical of business profits. As is the case with many issues, Solid Liberals’ views of business profits are diametrically opposed to Staunch Conservatives’ – 77% say corporate profits are excessive while just 17% say most businesses make a fair profit.

Creating the Typology Groups in the Survey

We divided the national survey’s respondents into eight politically engaged groups, along with a ninth group of less engaged Bystanders. The assignment of individuals to one of the eight core typology groups is based primarily on their position on nine scales of social and political values – each of which is determined by responses to two or three survey questions – as well as their party identification. The typology groups are created using a statistical procedure called “cluster analysis” which accounts for respondents’ scores on all nine scales as well as party identification to sort them into relatively homogeneous groups.

Cluster analysis is not an exact process. Several different cluster solutions were evaluated for their effectiveness in producing cohesive groups that were sufficiently distinct from one another, large enough in size to be analytically practical, and substantively meaningful. While each solution differed somewhat from the others, all of them shared certain key features. The final solution selected to produce the political typology was judged to be strongest from a statistical point of view, most persuasive from a substantive point of view, and was representative of the general patterns seen across the various cluster solutions.

For more about how the typology is created see About the Typology.

Determining Which Group You Fit In

To match you up with a group, we used the national survey to determine how different patterns of responses to the values questions (and party affiliation) were associated with each of the typology groups in the survey. To do this, we used a technique known as logistic regression, which computes the strength of the association between a given set of questions and a particular outcome or result, in this case, membership in a given typology group. Separate logistic regressions were run for each of the eight typology groups to measure how each of the values scales and party affiliation were related to membership in the group. Although each respondent in the survey was assigned based on the cluster analysis, the regression procedure allows us to compute a probability of belonging to each group to assess the accuracy of the logistic regression procedure. Ideally, members of a given typology group in the survey should end up with a higher probability of belonging to their group than any other group. In fact, that was the case for about 90% of the survey’s respondents.

When you take the web quiz version of the survey, the same logistic regression procedure is used to compute your probability of membership in each typology group. These are compared with each other, and the group for which you have the highest probability of membership is the group to which you are assigned.

Most people, but not all, are good fits for their group. Some patterns of responses to the value questions and party affiliation just do not match up well with any of the groups. The procedure will assign everyone to the group that fits them best, even if they are not a very good fit with any of the groups. And some people may actually be good fits for more than one group, since some of the groups are quite similar in many of their views.

If you feel you do not fit well with the group you are assigned to, that does not mean there is anything wrong with your responses. Your set of values may just be unique! You may not fit well in any of the groups or you may share values with many of the groups.

With the economy still struggling and the nation involved in multiple military operations overseas, the public’s political mood is fractious. In this environment, many political attitudes have become more doctrinaire at both ends of the ideological spectrum, a polarization that reflects the current atmosphere in Washington.

Yet at the same time, a growing number of Americans are choosing not to identify with either political party, and the center of the political spectrum is increasingly diverse. Rather than being moderate, many of these independents hold extremely strong ideological positions on issues such as the role of government, immigration, the environment and social issues. But they combine these views in ways that defy liberal or conservative orthodoxy.

For political leaders in both parties, the challenge is not only one of appeasing ideological and moderate “wings” within their coalitions, but rather holding together remarkably disparate groups, many of whom have strong disagreements with core principles that have defined each party’s political character in recent years.

The most visible shift in the political landscape since Pew Research’s previous political typology in early 2005 is the emergence of a single bloc of across-the-board conservatives. The long-standing divide between economic, pro-business conservatives and social conservatives has blurred. Today, Staunch Conservatives take extremely conservative positions on nearly all issues – on the size and role of government, on economics, foreign policy, social issues and moral concerns. Most agree with the Tea Party and even more very strongly disapprove of Barack Obama’s job performance. A second core group of Republicans – Main Street Republicans – also is conservative, but less consistently so.

On the left, Solid Liberals express diametrically opposing views from the Staunch Conservatives on virtually every issue. While Solid Liberals are predominantly white, minorities make up greater shares of New Coalition Democrats – who include nearly equal numbers 0f whites, African Americans and Hispanics – and Hard-Pressed Democrats, who are about a third African American. Unlike Solid Liberals, both of these last two groups are highly religious and socially conservative. New Coalition Democrats are distinguished by their upbeat attitudes in the face of economic struggles.

Independents have played a determinative role in the last three national elections. But the three groups in the center of the political typology have very little in common, aside from their avoidance of partisan labels. Libertarians and Post-Moderns are largely white, well-educated and affluent. They also share a relatively secular outlook on some social issues, including homosexuality and abortion. But Republican-oriented Libertarians are far more critical of government, less supportive of environmental regulations, and more supportive of business than are Post-Moderns, most of whom lean Democratic.

Disaffecteds, the other main group of independents, are financially stressed and cynical about politics. Most lean to the Republican Party, though they differ from the core Republican groups in their support for increased government aid to the poor. Another group in the center, Bystanders, largely consign themselves to the political sidelines and for the most part are not included in this analysis.

These are the principal findings of the political typology study by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, which sorts Americans into cohesive groups based on values, political beliefs, and party affiliation. The new study is based on two surveys with a combined sample of 3,029 adults, conducted Feb. 22-Mar. 14, 2011 and a smaller callback survey conducted April 7-10, 2011 with 1,432 of the same respondents.

This is the fifth typology created by the Pew Research Center since 1987. Many of the groups identified in the current analysis are similar to those in past typologies, reflecting the continuing importance of a number of key beliefs and values. But there are a number of critical differences as well.

The new groupings underscore the substantial political changes that have occurred since the spring of 2005, when the previous typology was released. Today, there are two core Republican groups, compared with three in 2005, to some extent reflecting a decline in GOP party affiliation. However, Democrats have not made gains in party identification. Rather, there has been a sharp rise in the percentage of independents – from 30% in 2005 to 37% currently. Today, there are three disparate groups of independents, compared with two in 2005.

While Republicans trail the Democrats in party affiliation, they enjoy advantages in other areas: The two core GOP groups are more homogenous – demographically and ideologically – than are the three core Democratic groups. And socioeconomic differences are more apparent on the left: Nearly half of Solid Liberals (49%) are college graduates, compared with 27% of New Coalition Democrats and just 13% of Hard-Pressed Democrats.

The GOP still enjoys an intensity advantage, which proved to be a crucial factor in the Republicans’ victories in the 2010 midterm elections. For example, the GOP’s core groups – Staunch Conservatives and Main Street Republicans – express strongly negative opinions about last year’s health care legislation, while reactions among the Democratic groups are more mixed. Even Solid Liberals offer only tepid support for the bill – 43% say it will have a mostly positive impact on the nation’s health care, while somewhat more (51%) say it will have a mixed effect.

However, maintaining solid support among the GOP-oriented groups in the center of the typology represents a formidable challenge for Republicans. The cross-pressured Disaffecteds highlight this challenge. They were an important part of the GOP coalition in 2010, but were lackluster supporters of John McCain two years earlier.

Like the core GOP groups, most Disaffecteds (73%) view government as nearly always wasteful and inefficient. At the same time, a solid majority of Disaffecteds (61%) say the government should do more to help needy Americans even if that means going deeper into debt.

Libertarians, the other Republican-leaning group, overwhelmingly oppose expanding aid for the poor if it means increasing the nation’s debt. Yet on immigration and homosexuality, Libertarians’ views differ markedly from those of the core Republican groups. Fully 71% of Libertarians say homosexuality should be accepted by society; nearly as many Staunch Conservatives (68%) say it should be discouraged.

Many of the political values and attitudes of Post-Moderns, young, Democratically-oriented independents, fit awkwardly with those of core Democratic groups. Post-Moderns overwhelmingly voted for Obama in 2008, but their turnout fell off dramatically last fall, which contributed to the Democrats’ poor showing in the midterms. Compared with the core Democratic groups, Post-Moderns are less supportive of increased aid for the needy and are far less likely to view racial discrimination as the main obstacle to African American progress.

Partisan Dividing Line: Views of Government

The new typology finds a deep and continuing divide between the two parties, as well as differences within both partisan coalitions. But the nature of the partisan divide has changed substantially over time.

More than in the recent past, attitudes about government separate Democrats from Republicans, and it is these beliefs that are most correlated with political preferences looking ahead to 2012. In 2005, at the height of the Iraq war and shortly after an election in which national security was a dominant issue, opinions about assertiveness in foreign affairs almost completely distinguished Democrats from Republicans. Partisan divisions over national security remain, but in an era when the public’s focus is more inward-looking, they are less pronounced.

As in recent years, beliefs about the environment, business, immigration and the challenges faced by African Americans are important fissures between the parties, though to some extent within them as well.

In general, there is far more agreement across the two core GOP groups than the three core Democratic groups. Staunch Conservatives and Main Street Republicans express highly critical opinions about government performance and are both deeply skeptical of increased government aid to the poor if it means adding to the debt.

Yet Staunch Conservatives have much more positive opinions about business than do Main Street Republicans. Attitudes about the environment also divide the two core GOP groups: 92% of Staunch Conservatives say that stricter environmental laws cost too many jobs and hurt the economy; just 22% of Main Street Republicans agree.

The differences among core Democratic groups show up across a wider range of fundamental political values. Social and moral issues divide Solid Liberals, who are more secular, from other Democratic groups who are much more religious.

Opinions about business, immigration and the economic impact of environmental laws and regulations also divide the Democratic groups. For instance, more than half of Hard-Pressed Democrats (54%) say that stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy; just 22% of New Coalition Democrats and 7% of Solid Liberals share this view.

Race and ethnicity are factors in some of the opinion differences among Democrats. New Coalition Democrats, who are roughly a quarter Hispanic, have positive views of immigrants. Fully 70% say immigrants strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents.

Hard-Pressed Democrats – who are mostly white and African American – take a dim view of immigrants’ contributions. Just 13% say immigrants strengthen the country, while 76% say they are a burden because they take jobs and health care.

Age also is a factor in partisanship and political values. Younger people are more numerous on the left, and older people on the right. However, many young people think of themselves as independents rather than as Democrats. Post-Moderns, Democratic-oriented independents, are by far the youngest group in the typology, but they often deviate from traditional Democratic orthodoxy and are not consistent voters.

Older people, who have increasingly voted Republican in recent years, are found disproportionately in the Staunch Conservative bloc – 61% are 50 or older. And this group is highly politically engaged; 75% say they follow government and public affairs most of the time.

Staunch Conservatives also include by far the largest share of Tea Party supporters – 72% of Staunch Conservatives agree with the movement. The Tea Party’s appeal is deeper than it is wide. There is no other typology group in which a majority agrees with the Tea Party. Aside from Staunch Conservatives, Libertarians are most supportive (44% agree).

The survey suggests that while the Tea Party is a galvanizing force on the right, strong disapproval of Barack Obama is an even more powerful unifying factor among fervent conservatives. No fewer than 84% of Staunch Conservatives strongly disapprove of Obama’s job performance and 70% rate him very unfavorably personally. Ardent support for Obama on the left is no match for this – 64% of Solid Liberals strongly approve of him, and 45% rate him very favorably.

More than two years into office, Obama’s personal image is positive though his job approval ratings are mixed. Yet doubts about Obama’s background and biography persist. More than one-in-five Americans (23%) say, incorrectly, that Obama was born outside the United States; another 22% are not sure where Obama was born. Nearly half of Staunch Conservatives (47%) and 35% of Main Street Republicans say that Obama was born in another country. Only among Solid Liberals is there near total agreement that Obama was, in fact, born in the United States (95%). (NOTE: The survey was conducted before President Obama released his long-form birth certificate on April 27.)

Other Major Findings

• Majorities in most typology groups say the country will need both to cut spending and raise taxes to reduce the budget deficit. Staunch Conservatives are the exception – 59% say the focus should only be on cutting spending.
• Core GOP groups largely prefer elected officials who stick to their positions rather than those who compromise. Solid Liberals overwhelmingly prefer officials who compromise, but the other two Democratic groups do not.
• For Staunch Conservatives it is still “Drill, Baby, Drill” – 72% say that expanding exploration for and production of oil, coal and natural gas is the more important energy priority. In most other typology groups, majorities say developing alternatives is more important.
• Republican groups say the Supreme Court should base rulings on its interpretation of the Constitution “as originally written.” Democratic groups say the Court should base its rulings on what the Constitution means today.
• Main Street Republicans and GOP-oriented Disaffecteds are far more likely than Staunch Conservatives or Libertarians to favor a significant government role in reducing childhood obesity.
• Solid Liberals are the only typology group in which a majority (54%) views democracy as more important than stability in the Middle East. Other groups say stable governments are more important or are divided on this question.
• New Coalition Democrats are more likely than the other core Democratic groups to say that most people can make it if they are willing to work hard.
• More Staunch Conservatives regularly watch Fox News than regularly watch CNN, MSNBC and the nightly network news broadcasts combined.
• There are few points on which all the typology groups can agree, but cynicism about politicians is one. Majorities across all eight groups, as well as Bystanders, say elected officials lose touch with the people pretty quickly.
• Staunch Conservatives overwhelmingly want to get tougher with China on economic issues. Across other typology groups, there is far more support for building stronger economic relations with China.
• The allied airstrikes in Libya divide Democratic groups. Solid Liberals and New Coalition Democrats favor the airstrikes, but about as many Hard-Pressed Democrats favor as oppose the operation.
• Michelle Obama is popular with Main Street Republicans, as well as most other typology groups. But Staunch Conservatives view the first lady unfavorably – and 43% view her very unfavorably.

Making the Typology

The 2011 typology divides the public into eight politically engaged groups, along with a ninth group of less engaged Bystanders. It is the fifth of its kind, following on previous studies in 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2005.

Using a statistical procedure called cluster analysis, individuals are assigned to one of the eight core typology groups based on their position on nine scales of social and political values – each of which is determined by responses to two or three survey questions – as well as their party identification. Several different cluster solutions were evaluated for their effectiveness in producing cohesive groups that are distinct from one another, substantively meaningful and large enough in size to be analytically practical. The final solution selected to produce the political typology was judged to be strongest from a statistical point of view and to be most persuasive from a substantive point of view. As in past typologies, a measure of political attentiveness and voting participation was used to extract the “Bystander” group, people who are largely not engaged or involved in politics, before performing the cluster analysis.

For a more complete description of the methodology used to create the typology, see About the Political Typology. For more information about the survey methodology seen About the Surveys.

Coming out of the 2004 election, the American political landscape decidedly favored the Republican Party. The GOP had extensive appeal among a disparate group of voters in the middle of the electorate, drew extraordinary loyalty from its own varied constituencies, and made some inroads among conservative Democrats. These advantages outweighed continued nationwide parity in party affiliation. Looking forward, however, there is no assurance that Republicans will be able to consolidate and build upon these advantages.

Republicans have neither gained nor lost in party identification in 2005. Moreover, divisions within the Republican coalition over economic and domestic issues may loom larger in the future, given the increasing salience of these matters. The Democratic party faces its own formidable challenges, despite the fact that the public sides with them on many key values and policy questions. Their constituencies are more diverse and, while united in opposition to President Bush, the Democrats are fractured by differences over social and personal values.

These are among the conclusions of Pew’s political typology study, which sorts voters into homogeneous groups based on values, political beliefs, and party affiliation. The current study is based on two public opinion surveys ­ a nationwide poll of 2,000 interviews conducted Dec. 1-16, 2004, and a subsequent re-interview of 1,090 respondents conducted March 17-27 of this year. This is the fourth such typology created by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press since 1987. Many of the groups identified in the current surveys are similar to those in past typologies, reflecting the continuing importance of a number of key beliefs and values. These themes endure despite the consequential events of the past four years ­ especially the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq.

But clearly, those events ­ and the overall importance of national security issues ­ have a major impact on the typology. Foreign affairs assertiveness now almost completely distinguishes Republican-oriented voters from Democratic-oriented voters; this was a relatively minor factor in past typologies. In contrast, attitudes relating to religion and social issues are not nearly as important in determining party affiliation. Still, these issues do underscore differences within parties, especially among the Democrats. While Republican-inclined voters range from the religious to the very religious, the Democratic Party is much more divided in terms of religious and cultural values. Its core constituents include both seculars and the highly religious.

The value gaps for the GOP are, perhaps surprisingly, greatest with respect to the role of government. The Republicans’ bigger tent now includes more lower-income voters than it once did, and many of these voters favor an activist government to help working class people. Government regulation to protect the environment is an issue with particular potential to divide Republicans. On this issue, wide divisions exist both within the GOP and among right-of-center voters more generally.

Yet Republicans also have much in common beyond their overwhelming support for a muscular foreign policy and broad agreement on social issues. Voters inclined toward the Republican Party are distinguished from Democrats by their personal optimism and belief in the power of the individual. While some voting blocs on the right are as financially stressed as poorer Democrats, Republicans in this situation tend to be more hopeful and positive in their outlook than their more fatalistic counterparts in the Democratic Party.

National security attitudes also generally unite the Democrats. Beyond their staunch opposition to the war in Iraq, Democrats overwhelmingly believe that effective diplomacy, rather than military strength, should serve as the basis for U.S. security policy. At home, Democrats remain committed to a strong social safety net and are joined in opposition to most domestic policy proposals from the Bush administration, from tougher bankruptcy laws to private accounts in Social Security.

The typology study’s finding of significant cleavages within parties not only runs counter to the widespread impression of a nation increasingly divided into two unified camps, but also raises questions about political alignments in the future. In particular, the study suggests that if the political agenda turns away from issues of defense and security, prospects for party unity could weaken significantly. As the following chapters detail, numerous opportunities exist for building coalitions across party lines on many issues currently facing the nation ­ coalitions that, in many cases, include some strange political bedfellows. Overall, there are many more shades to the American political landscape than just the red and blue dividing the Electoral College maps last Nov. 2.

The Political Middle

In some ways, the biggest difference between the latest Pew Research Center typology and those in the Clinton era concerns the groups in the middle of the political spectrum. During the 1990s, the typology groups in the center were not particularly partisan, but today they lean decidedly to the GOP.

The middle groups include Upbeats, relatively moderate voters who have positive views of their financial situation, government performance, business, and the state of the nation in general. They are generally well-educated and fairly engaged in political news. While most Upbeats do not formally identify with either political party, they voted for Bush by more than four-to-one last November.

A second, very different group of centrist voters, the Disaffecteds, is much less affluent and educated than the Upbeats. Consequently, they have a distinctly different outlook on life and political matters. They are deeply cynical about government and unsatisfied with their financial situation. Even so, Disaffecteds lean toward the Republican Party and, though many did not vote in the presidential election, most of those who did supported Bush’s reelection.

In effect, Republicans have succeeded in attracting two types of swing voters who could not be more different. The common threads are a highly favorable opinion of President Bush personally and support for an aggressive military stance against potential enemies of the U.S.

A third group in the center, Bystanders, largely consign themselves to the political sidelines. This category of mostly young people, few of whom voted in 2004, has been included in all four of the Center’s political typologies.

The Right

The Republican Party’s current advantage with the center makes up for the fact that the GOP-oriented groups, when taken together, account for only 29% of the public. By contrast, the three Democratic groups constitute 41% of the public. But the imbalance shifts to the GOP’s favor when the inclinations of the two major groups in the center are taken into account ­ many of whom lean Republican and most of whom voted for George W. Bush.

The three GOP groups are highly diverse, and this is reflected in their values. The staunchly conservative Enterprisers have perhaps the most consistent ideological profile of any group in the typology. They are highly patriotic and strongly pro-business, oppose social welfare and overwhelmingly support an assertive foreign policy. This group is largely white, well-educated, affluent and male ­ more than three-quarters are men.

While Enterprisers are a bit less religious than the other GOP groups, they are socially conservative in most respects. Two other groups on the right are both highly religious and very conservative on moral issues. Social Conservatives agree with Enterprisers on most issues, but they tend to be critical of business and supportive of government regulation to protect the public good and the environment. They also express deep concerns about the growing number of immigrants in America. This largely female group includes many white evangelical Christians, and nearly half of Social Conservatives live in the South.

Pro-Government Conservatives also are broadly religious and socially conservative, but they deviate from the party line in their backing for government involvement in a wide range of policy areas, such as government regulation and more generous assistance to the poor. This relatively young, predominantly female group is under substantial financial pressure, but most feel it is within their power to get ahead. This group also is highly concentrated in the South, and, of the three core Republican groups, had the lowest turnout in the 2004 election.

Clearly, there is more than one kind of conservative. The Republican groups find common ground on cultural values, but opinions on the role of government, a defining feature of conservative philosophy for decades, are now among the most divisive for the GOP.

The Left

At the other end of the political spectrum, Liberals have swelled to become the largest voting bloc in the typology. Liberals are opponents of an assertive foreign policy, strong supporters of environmental protection, and solid backers of government assistance to the poor.

This affluent, well-educated, highly secular group is consistently liberal on social issues, ranging from freedom of expression to abortion. In contrast, Conservative Democrats are quite religious, socially conservative and take more moderate positions on several key foreign policy questions. The group is older, and includes many blacks and Hispanics; of all the core Democratic groups, it has strongest sense of personal empowerment.

Disadvantaged Democrats also include many minority voters, and they are the least financially secure voting bloc. Members of this heavily female, poorly educated group are highly pessimistic about their opportunities in life, and also very mistrustful of both business and government. Nonetheless, they support government programs to help the needy.

While the Republican Party is divided over government’s role, the Democrats are divided by social and personal values. Most Liberals live in a world apart from Disadvantaged Democrats and Conservative Democrats.

Other Major Findings

• For the most part, opinions about the use of force are what divides Democratic-oriented groups from the Republican groups. On other foreign policy issues, even contentious questions about working with allies, the partisan pattern is not as clear.
• Environmental protection now stands out as a major divide within the GOP’s coalition. While a narrow majority of Enterprisers believe the country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the environment, most others on the GOP side disagree.
• Poorer Republicans and Democrats have strikingly different outlooks on their lives and possibilities. Pro-Government Conservatives are optimistic and positive; Disadvantaged Democrats are pessimistic and cynical.
• Immigration divides both parties. Liberals overwhelmingly believe immigrants strengthen American society, and most Enterprisers agree. Majorities of other groups in both parties say immigrants threaten traditional American customs and values.
• The Republican Party is doing a better job of standing up for its core issues than is the Democratic Party, according to their respective constituents. Liberals are particularly negative about the performance of the Democratic Party.
• A plurality of the public wants Bush to select a nominee who will keep the Supreme Court about the same as it is now. Only among Enterprisers and Social Conservatives is there substantial support for a more conservative course.
• Stem cell research deeply divides the GOP. Majorities in all three Democratic groups, and the three independent groups, favor such research. Republican groups, to varying degrees, are divided.
• Enterprisers take conservative positions on most religious and cultural issues but are less intense in their beliefs than are other GOP groups. They are more libertarian than other Republican-oriented groups.
• George W. Bush has the broadest personal appeal of any national political figure among the main independent groups, the Upbeats and Disaffecteds.
• Rudy Giuliani is widely popular with Republican groups but also has a favorable rating among majorities in both independent groups, and is viewed positively by roughly half of Conservative Democrats and Liberals.
• Bill and Hillary Clinton’s favorable ratings have risen among the public, and both earn relatively high ratings from the GOP’s Pro-Government Conservatives.
• Liberals stand far apart from the rest of the electorate in their strong support for gay marriage, and in opposing the public display of the Ten Commandments in government buildings.
• Enterprisers stand alone on key economic issues. Majorities in every other group ­ except Enterprisers ­ support a government guarantee of universal health insurance. Enterprisers also are the only group in which less than a majority supports increasing the minimum wage.
• Private investment accounts in Social Security draw mixed reviews. Support for Bush’s plan has faded not just among Democrats, but also independents. Disaffecteds are now evenly split over the proposal; in December, they favored it by almost a two-to-one margin.
• Enterprisers are the only voters to overwhelmingly believe that the Patriot Act is a necessary tool in the war on terrorism. Liberals are the strongest opponents of the legislation.

Foreword

In 1987, we embarked on an ambitious project to better understand the nature of American politics. We identified a broad range of beliefs and values that underlie common political labels and that ultimately drive political action. A voter typology emerged from this effort which classifies the electorate into distinct groupings, defined by their political, social, economic, and religious beliefs. Five years ago, we updated our study, finding a dramatically changed political landscape.

Today, we release version 3.0. Once again, we have found evidence of critical shifts in the electorate since 1994. The strong economy of the late 1990s has produced greater financial security and higher levels of satisfaction with the state of the nation. Reflecting this new public optimism, distrust of government and elected officials is down, and Americans express more tolerance for outsiders and a greater willingness to help the poor.

Our new study is based on three comprehensive surveys of nearly 5,000 Americans nationwide. This voter typology provides new insights into the nature of the electorate, the parties, and American politics as we approach the 2000 elections.

As with each new voter typology, we are able to measure long-term changes in the electorate by drawing on more than ten years of the Center’s comprehensive surveys of the American public. Since 1996, this work has been generously supported by the Pew Charitable Trusts. Times Mirror sponsored our work between 1987 and 1995. We are grateful for the support that has made these extensive studies possible.

Andrew Kohut
Director
Pew Research Center for The People & The Press

Retro-Politics

The new politics of the American people looks more like the old politics than anything the Center has observed in its 12 years of surveying the underlying political, social and economic attitudes of the electorate. The mood, party divisions and fault lines of the public are more traditional than what we found in 1987 at the end of the Reagan era or in 1994 on the eve of “the Gingrich revolution,” when the benchmark studies in this series were conducted. The current polling, based on nearly 5,000 interviews with national samples of the voting age population, identifies the following back-to-the-future trends.

The middle of the electorate is not dominated by angry, economically stressed voters whose allegiances are up for grabs, as we found in 1994. Rather the most important swing constituency is among the least angry, most moderate and most financially content segment of the voting public.

The Republican Party is no longer principally bifurcated between laissez faire economic conservatives on the one hand and populist social conservatives on the other, as we first described it in 1987. A clear well-defined, moderate wing of the party emerges.

Indeed, centrism, so characteristic of post-war American politics, is back. More moderation is not only apparent among Independents, but also evident on the right and on the left. Fewer Americans are highly critical of government. Political cynicism, while extensive, has lost some of its edge, and clearly voters are less interested in outsiders and political newcomers than they were earlier in the decade.

Democratic chances to retain control of the White House are once again threatened from within by social conservatives, who have rejected their party’s standard-bearer to some extent in every Democratic defeat since 1968. In this cycle, the issue for them is not principally ideological, but rather a hangover from the scandals of the Clinton administration.

Thanks to the Gingrich legacy, once again the Democratic Party has more adherents than the GOP. The Democrats have an even bigger image advantage over the Republicans owing to public hostility over impeachment. However, as has been the case in the past, these advantages may mean much more to congressional politics than to which party wins the presidency.

The Center’s political typology, which sorts voters into homogeneous groups based on political beliefs, party affiliation and voter participation, found striking parallels on both ends of the political spectrum. The new voter groupings on the right and the left are characterized by significant political centrism, as well as populism, at the expense of ideological consistency.

Many Americans continue to use the liberal and conservative labels, but only two segments of the electorate express coherent ideological points of view — Staunch Conservatives are consistently conservative on economic, social and international issues, while on balance, Liberal Democrats take the opposite position on each dimension.

Moderate Republicans and New Democrats are about as numerous as Conservatives and Liberals and hold much more centrist views. Moderate Republicans are less critical of government, more interventionist, more environmentalist, more tolerant, and less pro-business than Staunch Conservatives. They are also less loyal to the GOP. Although 98% Republican, 44% of them approve of Bill Clinton’s job performance.

New Democrats have less compassion than others in their party for the disadvantaged and are less critical of business. Yet like most Democrats, they express support for government and are more socially tolerant than the conservative wing of the Democratic Party. Reflecting their moderate views, fully half would consider voting for George W. Bush.

Populist Republicans and their Democratic counterpart, Socially Conservative Democrats, have mixed ideological values and have also contributed significantly to the crossover support for Clinton and now Bush, respectively. Populist Republicans are highly religious and socially conservative. But they have more moderate opinions about government and less favorable opinions of business corporations than Staunch Conservatives. Nearly one-third approve of Clinton’s job performance, and barely half give a good grade to the GOP’s congressional leadership.

On the Democratic side, Social Conservatives hold similar opinions about freedom of expression, homosexuality and immigrants. However, they have much stronger ties to unions, are more financially satisfied and show a penchant for partisan defection. Like their Reagan Democrat predecessors, 55% say there is at least some chance they would vote for Bush, and 29% backed him over Al Gore when this poll was first taken.

While the defections of Populist Republicans or Democrats might prove decisive in a close election, the most votes up for grabs are in the middle of the electorate. The two politically independent groups, one upbeat in its views and the other downbeat, contain many former Ross Perot voters who look at the political scene differently than most Democrats and Republicans.

New Prosperity Independents are moderate, young to middle-aged voters whose affluence, Internet savvy and stock market investments lead them to strongly endorse the status quo. But while 55% of this group, which strongly favors both handgun control and a capital gains reduction, approve of Clinton, just 24% are inclined to vote for Gore.

Disaffecteds, who are at the opposite end of the socioeconomic spectrum and are alienated and cynical rather than confident and upbeat, hold many similar political views. But, they are less important as voters because of their limited participation. In contrast, the Partisan Poor, who are also financially stressed, vote much more regularly. This most racially mixed bloc looks to government for solutions to its problems and remains strongly loyal to the Democratic Party. This is the only voting bloc in the country that wishes Clinton could run for a third term.

Americans’ Attitudes Mellow

The moderating trend in these political groupings reflects changes in underlying attitudes that the Center has monitored since 1987.¹ The current national survey finds somewhat less political cynicism and fewer people highly critical of government than in the past, and especially in comparison to 1994 when the Center developed its last version of the typology. For example, fewer Americans now think they don’t have any say in what the government does, and a smaller percentage believe that things run by the government are usually inefficient and wasteful.

At the same time, the polling shows more compassion toward the poor and less hostility toward immigrants. A greater percentage in this survey than in the recent past think the government should do more to help needy people, and fewer express strong support for tightening our borders to further restrict immigration. Both of these trends may reflect the increased economic satisfaction and diminished financial pressure registered in this year’s survey. Gains in economic contentment have been greatest among upper income groups, while people in the lowest income category report less financial pressure but no more financial satisfaction than in the mid-1990s. Unexpectedly, despite these trends, Americans report no greater satisfaction with their wages than in the recent past. In fact, middle-income people are less satisfied than they were in 1994.

A diminished appetite for political change is apparent, along with the moderating political attitudes we observed. The percentage of respondents who say that Washington needs new faces is lower than in the mid-1990s: Today 49% want new faces, down from 60% in 1994. The percentage saying it’s time for current leaders to step aside has fallen somewhat as well (73% today vs. 79% in 1994). However, the survey also found less interest in national affairs and Washington politics than did previous polls in this series.

No Big Issue, But a Moral Undertone

As in other surveys, no overarching issue emerges as the electorate’s number one priority. If there is one theme in public concerns, however, it is a worry about the nation’s moral health. This is voiced in a variety of ways by one-third of respondents in open-ended questioning. Respondents mention family values, teen violence, crime, and other moral shortcomings. But, when these same people are asked about priorities, moral concerns get highest priority only from Staunch Conservatives and Populist Republicans. Improving education is the top priority of the pivotal New Prosperity Independents as well as Liberal Democrats, while the more conservative Democratic groups place more emphasis on dealing with entitlements.

Surprisingly, Republican groups are more divided on the specific policy questions than are Democrats. Staunch Conservatives express opposition to a minimum wage hike, HMO reform and gun control, whereas Populists and Moderates back these proposals. Foreign policy issues also divide the GOP. Fully 69% of Staunch Conservatives oppose American involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo, while 69% of Moderates back it and Populists lean against it. Democrats are divided on abortion. Socially Conservative Democrats and the Partisan Poor strongly favor parental consent; Liberal Democrats are evenly divided on this issue.

“Bush Coalition” Familiar

Bush’s patterns of support are reminiscent of winning GOP coalitions in the recent past. The Texas governor’s candidacy has very strong backing from all three core GOP groups: Staunch Conservatives, Populists and Moderates. He also gets the support of Independent voters at both ends of the economic spectrum. Affluent New Prosperity Independents strongly support him, and even Disaffected Independents lean to Bush.

Like Ronald Reagan before him and his father in 1988, George W. also has considerable appeal to the conservative wing of the Democratic Party — especially the Social Conservatives. Liberal Democrats and the Partisan Poor give Gore the most early support, but their enthusiasm is more muted than that shown by core Republicans for Bush. This survey finds that Clinton fatigue is more of a factor in the potential defections of Social Conservatives than for other Democratic groups. However Gore’s own leadership image is relatively weak among most Democrats, and very weak among Independents.

Former New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley tested as well against Bush as Gore did when this poll was taken, even though many voters may still know little about him. Bradley has more appeal to Independent voters, especially affluent New Prosperity Independents, and he has more crossover appeal to Republicans.

Bush is the prohibitive favorite for the nomination among all GOP groups, and a majority in every typology group except Liberal Democrats and the Partisan Poor would at least consider voting for the Texas governor next November. In contrast, it is mostly Staunch Conservatives, Moderate Republicans and New Prosperity Independents who would consider voting for Steve Forbes. John McCain appeals to two groups who agree on little else, Staunch Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Among voters who have heard of him, Gary Bauer gets the most consideration from Populist Republicans, but even among this receptive group relatively few know of him.

The Reform Party’s Patrick Buchanan and Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura are known to more than 80% of voters, but less than 30% say there is some chance they would cast a ballot for either of them. The former pundit and speech writer has somewhat greater appeal among Staunch Conservatives, while Independent Disaffecteds are a little more drawn to the former pro wrestler. However, both are more appealing to young voters than older people.

The poll finds voters looking for the same personal qualities in a president as they did four years ago: good judgment in a crisis, high ethical standards and compassion. But more now say that a president should serve as a role model to help keep families together and improve the nation’s moral health. These opinions are shared for the most part by all voter groups, but Republicans, especially Staunch Conservatives and Populist Republicans, place more emphasis than Democrats on the president as a role model. Only Staunch Conservatives give short shrift to compassion in a president.

Democratic Edge in Congressional Elections

Although Democrats are potentially less unified than Republicans with regard to presidential voting intentions, they seem more inclined to get behind their party’s congressional candidates than do Republican groups. For example, Moderate Republicans and Populist Republicans do not match Staunch Conservatives in their support for their party’s congressional candidates.

This contributes to the Democratic Party’s 49% to 43% lead in the congressional ballot test in this survey. However, the GOP’s losses in adherents and image weakness in recent years contribute as well. Collations of national Pew Research Center surveys of more than 10,000 respondents per year over the decade find affiliation with the GOP at 27% in 1998 and 1999, down from 30% in 1994 and 32% in 1995. Democratic affiliation has increased only marginally during that period. However, more Americans hold a favorable opinion of the party than did in 1994 (59% vs. 50%) while many fewer have a positive opinion of the GOP over that same period (53% vs. 67%). Although the Republican Party’s favorability ratings have rebounded somewhat from backlash against it for pushing impeachment, voters continue to express more confidence in the Democrats on most issues, save morality and taxes.

These trends notwithstanding, since 1990 increased majorities of both Republicans and Democrats say that they sometimes vote for the other party.

Other Findings:

The survey contains one cautionary note about George W. Bush’s strong showing in the polls, when it finds that 70% of all voters questioned think that he will be elected president in November. This is nearly identical to the percentage who felt that way about his father in the fall of 1991!

Support for a third party has been up and down in Center surveys, and the new polling finds a 54% majority saying that the country needs a third major political party.

The falloff in Republican Party affiliation is most dramatic among young Americans. Young men have migrated toward the Democratic Party while young women have become more independent.

HMO reform has become a bipartisan issue. Republican support has increased 14 percentage points in the last year, from 36% in 1998 to the current 50%. Support among Independents has increased from 44% to 65% this year. Among Democrats, the percentage has gone from 63% to 73%.

These are the results of three nationwide Pew Research Center surveys conducted over the last four months. The main typology survey of 3,973 adults was conducted July 14 – September 9, 1999, and has a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percentage points. Additionally, a sample of 1,411 adults who were interviewed for the main survey were re-interviewed during a second poll conducted October 7 – 11, 1999. Finally, the results for the Center’s longstanding political values measures are based on a survey of 985 adults conducted September 28 – October 10, 1999.

After two presidential debates and six weeks of the general campaign Bill Clinton’s lead over Bob Dole is as large as it was in early September. The course of the race has changed little with the passing of each important campaign milestone. The only observable consequence of the debates is that the percentage of voters who say they might switch to Bob Dole is lower than it was just prior to the first debate (11% vs. 16%). The Pew voter typology, which divides the electorate by core values, finds Dole unable to forge a coalition of staunch conservatives, moderates and populists.

The unchanged standings also reflect the breadth of the Clinton coalition. The President is getting strong support from the left, right and center of his own party and has won over working class Independents who had big doubts about him as recently as a year ago.

In stark contrast, Dole has not only failed to attract Independents, but he has been unable to rally key Republican segments. His support is weak among economically squeezed populist conservatives. He has also turned off moderate economic conservatives, with whom Bill Clinton has made inroads. Dole only gets overwhelming support from Republicans who are both economically and socially conservative.

The Pew Research Center’s voter classification system (typology) categorizes voters based on their political values, party affiliation, and political participation into ten groups — four Democratic, three Independent and three Republican. In the summer of 1994 when voter support was about equally divided between Clinton (39%) and Dole (36%), and when Perot had a larger following (20%), moderate Democratic groups were not enthusiastic about the President.[1. The typology is described in an appendix to this report (see “About the Typology”).

But in the current survey, right-of-center Democrats give Clinton a strong vote of confidence. Fully 86% of moderate New Democrats say they would vote for Clinton if the election were being held today, as do 74% of older, socially conservative New Dealers. More liberal groups are even more enthusiastic. Nine out of ten voters among the liberal Seculars and among the disadvantaged Partisan Poor favor Clinton.

A profile of left of center groups in this election follows.

• New Democrats(moderate on economic issues, strong environmentalists) Clinton has gained 25 % points with this group since 1994. Opinions of Dole have turned sharply negative (62% unfavorable now vs. 34% in 1994). Clinton is not seen as weak on personal character. His record and presidential attributes impress this group.
• New Dealers (older, unionist, socially conservative) Clinton’s support is weakest and hostility to him strongest (23% unfavorable) here among all Democratic groups. But New Dealers have also turned against Dole (80% unfavorable, vs. 43% in 1994). The character issue dogs Clinton with this group, but he wins points on Medicare (by 57% to 5%, they prefer his position over Dole’s). A key attraction for many is that Clinton sidetracked GOP Congressional efforts. New Dealers, who often defected to Ronald Reagan, are the Democratic group least satisfied with the quality of the presidential candidates this year. One in three (30%) would prefer a GOP Congress if Clinton is re-elected.
• Seculars (tolerant, progressive, low religious practice) These affluent liberals are most likely to cite party (perhaps a surrogate for ideology) as their main reason for backing Clinton. Worried that health care, education and other social issues are being overlooked, Seculars prefer Clinton over Dole on Medicare by a margin of 65% to 4%. Three-quarters (74%) think Dole’s tax cut would be the wrong thing for the country. The group is most likely to express anti-incumbent sentiment in the race for Congress.
• Partisan Poor (disadvantaged, pro-social welfare) This reliably Democratic group now supports Clinton at the same level as it does Democratic Congressional candidates (90%). It cares little about the character issue. Instead, like New Dealers, it is more likely to prefer Clinton because he stymied GOP
• Congressional efforts. Economically anxious and concerned about the safety net, this group prefers Clinton’s position on Medicare over Dole’s, 73% to 6%.

Fractious Republicans

There is much less unity among Republican groups. Only two in three populists (Moralists) are backing Dole. The former Senate Majority leader has actually lost a lot of ground among Libertarians since 1994, and is trailing Clinton among them. However, hardcore conservatives, who intensely dislike the President, are solidly behind Dole.

Enterprisers (affluent economic and social conservatives) This is one of two groups in which Dole has gained ground since 1994. Although strongly anti-Clinton (61% very unfavorable opinion), even this classic GOP group lacks enthusiasm for the GOP presidential nominee: nearly half (44%) say they are voting for Dole mainly because they don’t like his opponents. Enterprisers are the only group in the electorate with a majority (61%) believing the Dole tax cut is good for the country.

Moralists (social conservatives, critical of big business and big government) The most economically anxious group among Republicans, Moralists are not convinced they will be better off with Dole in the White House. They don’t think a 15% tax cut would be good for the country. They believe labor unions and business corporations have too much influence on who becomes President (57% and 62%, respectively). One-in-three (33%) have very unfavorable views of the President.

Libertarians (socially tolerant, conservatives) These moderates are unimpressed by Dole and his tax proposal. In fact, more of them have a favorable opinion of Clinton than Dole (53% vs. 35%), and more believe a 15% tax cut would be the wrong rather than the right thing for the country (50% vs. 40%). Moral appeals and Clinton’s character problems have little impact on Libertarians. Two-thirds (67%) say Clinton’s record is what matters most, while only 16% think character is most important. Among Republican groups Libertarians feel most strongly that churches have too much influence on who gets elected President.

Independents

While party unity and the lack of it are big factors in the race, the President’s success in wooing the working class Independents represents the biggest percentage turn around since 1994. Perhaps with an assist from GOP Congressional leader Newt Gingrich, he has succeeded with the waitress moms and double shift dads who have no firm anchor in either party. Clinton has also held his own with the most distrustful and alienated voter group, the Embittered, whose natural tendency is to vote against incumbents.

New Economy Independents (middle income, weak party ties, female, mixed liberal/conservative values)

These voters are far more likely to have favorable views of Clinton than Dole now (63% vs. 26%), whereas two years ago the two men were rated about evenly (Clinton 58%, Dole 54%). Economic anxiety remains high among them. They worry about the social safety net; by a margin of 47% to 11%, they prefer Clinton’s approach to Medicare over Dole’s. They want to hear more from the candidates about social issues, including education and health care. In their view, Clinton’s presidential character (i.e. performance in office) outweighs concerns about his personal character. They give Clinton a big edge over Dole as the candidate who would use good judgment in a crisis (58% vs. 22%), is a strong leader (53% vs. 26%), cares about people like me (50% vs. 19%) and shares my values (49% vs. 28%).

The Embittered (cynical, distrustful, low income) A majority of this group holds an unfavorable opinion of both presidential candidates. It is the only non- Republican group in which Dole appears to have gained any ground since 1994. Attacks on Clinton’s character have taken a toll on Clinton’s image in this group, which is economically pressured and supports Dole’s 15 % tax cut proposal.

Anxiety may replace anger as the dominant voter emotion in 1996. A major national survey finds significantly more Americans than 18 months ago worried about affording major expenses such as health care costs, college tuition, retirement funds and housing costs. Voter anxiety has increased across the political spectrum and appears to be dividing the Republican coalition and turning off Independents. At the same time, Democratic groups are uniting in opposition to GOP policies and are more politically energized.

Times Mirror’s voter typology finds greater support for Bill Clinton’s job performance among Democratic groups than support for GOP policies among Republican groups. More than seven-in-ten voters classified as left of center approve of the President’s performance. On the conservative side, strong support for the policies of GOP leaders is only found among “free market” Enterprisers (79% approve). However, among socially conservative Moralists, just 66% express approval, and even fewer (56%) of Libertarians voice support for the policies of the Republican leaders. Two swing voting groups, the economically anxious New Economy Independents and The Embittered, mostly approve of Bill Clinton’s performance and overwhelmingly disapprove of GOP policies.

Voter worries about affording major expenses appear to be playing an important role in the rising political fortunes of Bill Clinton and the sagging popularity of Republican policies. The percentage of Americans very worried that they cannot afford health care costs rose from 50% in March of 1994 to 66% in the current survey. Similarly, the survey found increased worries about saving enough money to retire (42% to 48%), paying for college tuition (37% to 44%), losing a job or taking a pay cut (28% to 34%), and being able to own or afford to keep a home (31% to 38%).

On balance, more Democrats and Independents are worried about all of these things than Republicans, but the “bigger tent” GOP now counts within its ranks a greater percentage of middle class people who are very concerned about their financial future. Most dramatically, while only 36% of Enterpriser Republicans are very worried about being able to afford health care, fully 64% of Moralists are. The same pattern is evident for most other major financial matters. For example, the adequacy of retirement funds is a worry for just 29% of Enterprisers but 50% of Moralists.

The political consequence of these concerns also emerges clearly in the survey. As shown in the table below, Republicans who are anxious about paying health care costs are significantly less likely to approve of GOP policies than are Republicans who are not so worried about these expenses. At the same time, worried Independents are much more apt to think well of Bill Clinton and disapprove of Republican ideas than are Independents who are less anxious about paying their health care bills.

Reflecting a dramatically changed environment in America and the world, the voter typology which Times Mirror created in 1987 has been modified to make it more responsive to the new values and attitudes that affect voter behavior in 1994. We present it as “The People, The Press and Politics: The New Political Landscape.”

Highlights of our findings are given in an Overview, followed by descriptions of the key building blocks of the new typology. The values and attitudes of the electorate are detailed in Section 1, and the trends in party identification and party attitudes in Section 2.

The new political typology, based on these values and political self-identification, is then presented in Section 3, including descriptions of nine different categories of voters dispersed across the right, center, and left of the political spectrum.

Viewed through the prism of the new typology, the consequences of the new political landscape are discussed in Section 4: priorities of the electorate; policy issues; voter intentions and judgments, including trial heats of possible presidential races; and public attitudes toward institutions, including the media, as well as organizations and movements.

A final section details the methodology by which we arrived at the typology. Addenda consist of the top-line results of the surveys and the questionnaires used in the polling. Project participants included Larry Hugick as survey analyst; Robert C. Toth, editor; Carol Bowman, research director, Carolyn Miller, survey statistician, and Kim Parker, assistant research director.

Seen through the Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press’ political typology of 1990, the American electorate presents a disquieting picture of political gridlock. Despite the personal popularity of President Bush, cynicism toward the political system in general is growing as the public in unprecedented numbers associates Republicans with wealth and greed, Democrats with fecklessness and incompetence. This cynicism, combined with increased economic polarization among Americans at all but the wealthiest levels (especially among the poor and minority populations), threatens to subvert traditional partisan politics or block the effective resolution of social and economic issues. In addition, while anti-communism is fading as a factor in American politics, anti-Japanese sentiment has soared as economic expectations plummet.

The Times Mirror typology was constructed by classifying people according to nine basic values and orientations, by their party affiliation and by their degree of political involvement. This 1990 study represents the fourth in a series of annual typology analyses initiated by the Center in 1987.

There are 11 distinct groups in the American electorate — 10 that vote in varying degrees, and one that does not vote at all. How Americans vote is a much more complex process than previously defined. There have been many attempts to analyze political attitudes in this country. Some analysts have focused on party as the key factor, while others stress ideology, issues, or generation. But the Times Mirror study conducted by The Gallup Organization, based on 4,244 exhaustive, in-person interviews, reveals far more complexity and many more voting factors than have previously been quantified and analyzed.