Even as public views of the federal government in Washington have fallen to another new low, the public continues to see their state and local governments in a favorable light. Overall, 63% say they have a favorable opinion of their local government, virtually unchanged over recent years. And 57% express a favorable view of their state government – a five-point uptick from last year. By contrast, just 28% rate the federal government in Washington favorably. That is down five points from a year ago and the lowest percentage ever in a Pew Research Center survey.

The percentage of Democrats expressing a favorable opinion of the federal government has declined 10 points in the past year, from 51% to 41%. For the first time since Barack Obama became president, more Democrats say they have an unfavorable view of the federal government in Washington than a favorable view (51% unfavorable vs. 41% favorable). Favorable opinions of the federal government among Republicans, already quite low in 2012 (20% favorable), have fallen even further, to 13% currently.

The national survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted March 13-17 among 1,501 adults, finds positive ratings across party lines for state and local governments overall. But the partisan makeup of the state government matters: Republicans give more positive ratings to GOP-led state governments, while Democrats rate Democratic-led state governments more highly.

Notably, politically divided state governments get positive ratings from members of both parties. In the 13 states with divided governments – those in which the governor and a majority of state legislators are from different parties – majorities of both Republicans and Democrats express favorable opinions of their state governments.

A sizable majority of Americans (69%) say that their state is currently facing budget problems. However, assessments of state budgets were even more negative two years ago; in February 2011, 81% said their state was encountering budget problems. And while just 30% say that economic conditions in their state are excellent or good, that is nearly double the percentage expressing a positive view of the national economy (16% excellent or good).

Partisan Views of Government

Currently, 41% of Democrats say they have a favorable opinion of the federal government, compared with 27% of independents and just 13% of Republicans. By contrast, state and local governments are viewed favorably across-the-board.

Nearly identical percentages of Democrats (56%), Republicans (57%) and independents (59%) have a favorable opinion of their state’s government. Similarly, local governments receive positive ratings from 67% of Democrats, 63% of Republicans and 60% of independents.

While there is partisan agreement in overall ratings of state governments, these opinions differ markedly depending on which party controls the government.

Fully 71% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents who live in Republican-led states (those with a GOP governor and state legislature) have a favorable opinion of their state government. But just 30% of Republicans living in Democratic-led states view their state governments favorably.

Democrats and Democratic leaners in Democratic-led states express positive views of their state governments (64% favorable). But unlike Republicans, Democrats do not have unfavorable opinions of state governments led by the opposing party. Among Democrats living in Republican-led states, as many have a favorable (50%) as unfavorable (46%) opinion of their state government.

Politically divided state governments receive about the same ratings from Democrats and Democratic leaners (64% favorable) as from Republicans and Republican leaners (58% favorable).

Views of State Governors

Overall, state governors received a positive rating from the public: 55% rate their state’s governor favorably, compared with 30% who hold an unfavorable view. Views of state governors in states with a Republican officeholder (55% favorable) are nearly identical to views in states with Democratic governors (56%).

Unlike views of state governments, neither Republicans nor Democrats offer highly negative ratings of their governor, even in cases where the opposing party holds office.

Overall, 43% of Republicans and Republican leaners in states with a Democratic governor rate their state governor favorably, while 48% have an unfavorable view. Opinions among Democrats and leaners in states with an opposing party governor also are mixed: 43% of Democrats in states with a Republican governor express a favorable view of their state governor, 44% an unfavorable one.

Both Republicans and Democrats offer a highly favorable view of their governor in states where their own party is in control (73% of Republicans and Republican leaners, 68% of Democrats and Democratic leaners).

Modest Improvement in Views of State Budgets

Nearly seven-in-ten Americans (69%) say their state is experiencing budget problems, down from 81% two years ago. The percentage saying their state does not face budget problems has nearly doubled, from 12% to 21%, during this period.

The percentage saying their state’s budget problems are very serious also has dipped, from 36% in February 2011 to 31% currently.

State economic ratings also have shown modest improvement. Three-in-ten (30%) say economic conditions in their state are excellent (3%) or good (27%), up from 23% two years ago.

Ratings of state economic conditions are more positive than national economic ratings. Just 16% describe national economic conditions as excellent or good; this compares with 30% who describe the economy of the state they live in as excellent or good in the current survey.

Respondents in states with a Republican governor offer slightly better economic ratings than those living in states with a Democratic governor. About a third (34%) of those in states with a GOP governor describe economic conditions as excellent or good, compared with 24% of those in states with Democratic governors. Similarly, fewer in Republican-governed states say their state is currently experiencing budget problems (66%) than those in Democratic-governed states (73%).

Federal Government’s Declining Favorability

Favorable ratings for the federal government rose dramatically after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but have declined substantially since then. In November 2001, 82% had a favorable opinion of the government and in December 2002, 73% viewed the federal government favorably.

Positive opinions of the government declined through the remainder of George W. Bush’s presidency and have continued to fall during the Obama administration. Currently, 28% have a favorable impression of the federal government while 65% have an unfavorable view.

Partisan views of the federal government have shifted depending on which party controls the White House. Currently, Democrats have a more favorable impression of the federal government than do Republicans; during the Bush administration, Republicans expressed more favorable opinions.

However, there has been a steep decline in the share of Democrats expressing a favorable opinion of the federal government since Obama took office, from 61% in July 2009 to 41% currently. Favorable opinions also have fallen among Republicans over this period, from 24% to 13% — the lowest ever favorable rating among members of either party.

Appendix: Party of Governors and State Legislatures

States with Republican governors:

AL, AK, AZ, FL, GA, ID, IN, IA, KS, LA, ME, MI, MS, NE, NV, NJ, NM, NC, ND, OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY

States with Democratic governors:
AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IL, KY, MD, MA, MN, MO, MT, NH, NY, OR, VT, WA, WV

Republican governors and Republican majorities in both state House and Senate:
AL, AK, AZ, FL, GA, ID, IN, KS, LA, MI, MS, NC, ND, OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI, WY

Democratic governors and Democratic majorities in both state House and Senate:
CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IL, MD, MA, MN, OR, VT, WA, WV

Mixed party control of governorship, state House and state Senate:
AR, IA, KY, ME, MO, MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, RI

Sources: National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors Association.

At a time when the Republican Party’s image is at a historic low, 62% of the public says the GOP is out of touch with the American people, 56% think it is not open to change and 52% say the party is too extreme.

Opinions about the Democratic Party are mixed, but the party is viewed more positively than the GOP in every dimension tested except one. Somewhat more say the Republican Party than the Democratic Party has strong principles (63% vs. 57%).

The national survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted Feb. 13-18 among 1,504 adults, comes at a time when Republican leaders are debating the party’s future in the wake of Barack Obama’s reelection. The Republican Party’s image has been hit hard over the past decade. In January, just 33% said they viewed the party favorably, among the lowest marks of the last 20 years. The GOP’s favorable rating has not been above 50% since shortly after George W. Bush’s reelection in 2004.

An earlier release from the survey by the Pew Research Center and USA TODAY found that while both party’s congressional leaders receive negative job ratings, just 25% approve of the job performance of GOP leaders, compared with 37% approval for Democratic congressional leaders.

The new report finds that while the Democratic Party is viewed more positively on most traits tested, opinion is divided about whether the party is out of touch with the American people: 46% say it is, while 50% it is not. And only somewhat more say the Democratic Party is looking out for the country’s future than say that about the Republican Party (51% vs. 45%).

Republicans More Critical of Their Party

Republicans are more critical of their party than Democrats are of theirs on most issues. For example, 36% of Republicans say the GOP is out of touch with the American people. Just 23% of Democrats say their party is out of touch. And while 30% of Republicans say their party is not open to change, just 10% of Democrats make the same criticism of their party.

However, Republicans overwhelmingly credit their party for having strong principles; 85% say the GOP has strong principles while 13% say it does not. And 80% of Republicans say their party is looking out for the country’s long-term future.

The GOP also gets high marks from independents and Democrats for having strong principles. Fully 62% of independents say the Republican Party has strong principles, the most positive measure for any party trait tested. Even about half of Democrats (52%) say the Republican Party has strong principles.

Partisan views about whether the Republican Party is too extreme are mirror images: 78% of Republicans say the GOP is not too extreme, while 19% say it is; 78% of Democrats view the Republican Party as too extreme while 19% disagree.

Democrats express highly positive views of their party across-the-board, while Republicans’ opinions about the Democratic Party are uniformly negative. At least 80% of Democrats evaluate their party positively on every trait except one, being out of touch with the American people. Even there, 76% of Democrats say their party is not out of touch, while just 23% say it is.

Far more independents say the Democratic Party is open to change than say that about the Republican Party (54% vs. 39%). The gap is roughly the same in independents’ views about whether the parties are out of touch (65% Republican vs. 51% Democratic) and too extreme (51% vs. 40%).

However, independents are divided over whether the Democratic Party looks out for the country’s future: 45% say it does and 51% say it does not. Independents have similar views about whether the Republican Party looks out for the future (43% yes, 51% no).

About a quarter of independents (27%) say that neither party is looking out for the country’s future. An even higher percentage of independents (37%) say that both parties are out of touch with the American people.

Overall Views of Parties

The Republican Party’s overall image stands at one of the lowest points in nearly two decades. And, while impressions of the Democratic Party are much stronger, they are far below where they were four years ago.

In January, 33% of the public had a favorable view of the GOP, compared with 58% who held an unfavorable impression of the party. Among Republicans themselves, 69% had a favorable impression, down from a recent high of 89% reported after the GOP convention. Majorities of both Democrats and independents viewed the Republican Party unfavorably (83% and 58%, respectively).

Views of the Democratic Party were evenly divided in January: 47% favorable, 46% unfavorable. Among Democrats, 87% had a favorable impression of their party while roughly the same percentage of Republicans held an unfavorable view (84%). Independents, on balance, had more unfavorable impressions of the Democratic Party (52%) than favorable ones (37%).

In more than 13,000 interviews conducted so far in 2012, 35% of registered voters identify with the Democratic Party, 28% with the Republican Party and 33% as independents. The share of Democrats has fallen three points since 2008, while the proportion of Republicans has remained steady.

When the leanings of independent voters are taken into account, the closing of the Democratic advantage is even more noticeable. Currently, independents lean slightly more toward the Republican Party than the Democratic Party (15% vs. 13%). Four years ago, the reverse was true (13% leaned Democratic, 11% Republican).

Overall, the Democrats now have a five-point lead in party affiliation among registered voters when independents who lean to either party are included (48% to 43%). That is down from a 12-point advantage in 2008 (51% to 39%). The current Democratic edge in leaned party identification is comparable to the slim leads they held in 2004 (three points) and 2000 (four points).

For a detailed analysis of recent trends in party identification, the composition of the parties and the opinions and values of Republicans and Democrats, see the accompanying tables.

White Voters Turn Toward GOP

Over the past four years, the shift in party identification has occurred almost entirely among white voters. The Republican Party now has a 12-point advantage over Democrats among non-Hispanic white voters: 52% identify with or lean toward the Republican Party while 40% identify with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic. In 2008, the balance of party identification among whites was almost evenly divided (46% Republican vs. 44% Democrat). The Democratic Party’s advantage among blacks and Hispanics, by comparison, has remained largely unchanged.

The Republican Party’s current lead among white voters is not unprecedented – their advantage is on par with the GOP’s lead among whites from 2002-2004 and from 1994-1995. And all of the GOP gain among whites over the past four years is in leaning among independents. In other words, whites are no more likely to call themselves Republicans today than in 2008 (34% in both years), but they are more likely to lean Republican (17% today, up from 12% in 2008).

The Republican Party’s gains among whites cross many demographic subgroups. The GOP lead among white men has doubled from 11 points in 2008 (51% Republican or lean Republican vs. 40% Democrat/lean Democratic) to 22 points (57% vs. 35%). And white women, who leaned Democratic by a 49% to 42% margin in 2008, now tilt slightly toward the GOP by a 47% to 44% margin. The two parties now run even among white voters younger than 30, while Republicans have the advantage among all other age groups.

Lower-income and less educated whites also have shifted substantially toward the Republican Party since 2008. The GOP has largely erased the wide lead Democrats had among white voters with family incomes less than $30,000. And middle-income whites ($30,000-$74,999), who were split between the parties four years ago, now favor the GOP by 17 points. By contrast, there has been no shift among higher income whites, who favor the GOP by roughly the same margin today as in 2008.

Similarly, whites without a college degree now tilt decidedly toward the Republican Party – the GOP now holds a 54% to 37% advantage among non-college whites, who were split about evenly four years ago. The partisanship of white college graduates, by contrast, has not changed.

The Democratic Party continues to have a wide lead in party identification among Millennials, voters born after 1980. Currently 55% of Millennials identify with or lean to the Democratic Party, compared with 36% who identify or lean to the Republican Party. However, the Democrats’ advantage among Millennial voters has declined from 32 points in 2008 to 19 points today.

The balance of party identification is more evenly divided among other generations. Republicans have a four-point advantage among voters in the Silent Generation, while Democrats have an equivalent lead among Baby Boomers. Generation X is evenly divided (47% Democrat vs. 45% Republican).

GOP Voters: Overwhelmingly White, Mostly Male

The demographic differences between the Republican and Democratic voters are reflected in current profiles of the two parties’ bases. In surveys conducted in 2012, nearly nine-in-ten (87%) Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters are white, while just 11% are minorities. In contrast, 61% of Democrats are white, while nearly four-in-ten are African American (21%), Hispanic (10%) or another race (7%).

Men make up a majority (52%) of Republican Republican-leaning voters; among Democratic voters, 43% are men while 57% are women. Republican and Republican-leaning voters also are far more likely than Democratic voters to be married (65% of Republicans vs. 49% of Democrats).

Click here to see detailed tables showing trends in party affiliation, the demographic composition of the parties, and the opinions and values of Republicans and Democrats.

The latest Pew Research Center survey conducted July 16-26 among 1,956 registered voters nationwide found 51% supporting Barack Obama and 41% Mitt Romney. This is unquestionably a good poll for Obama – one of his widest leads of the year according to our surveys, though largely unchanged from earlier in July and consistent with polling over the course of this year.

And the survey did interview more Democrats than Republicans; 38% of registered voters said they think of themselves as Democrats, 25% as Republicans, and 33% as independents (to clarify, some reporters and bloggers incorrectly posted their own calculations of party identification based on unweighted figures). That’s slightly more Democrats than average over the past year, and slightly fewer Republicans. Recent Pew Research Center surveys have found anywhere from a one-point to a ten-point Democratic identification advantage, with an average of about seven points.

While it would be easy to standardize the distribution of Democrats, Republicans and independents across all of these surveys, this would unquestionably be the wrong thing to do. While all of our surveys are statistically adjusted to represent the proper proportion of Americans in different regions of the country; younger and older Americans; whites, African Americans and Hispanics; and even the correct share of adults who rely on cell phones as opposed to landline phones, these are all known, and relatively stable, characteristics of the population that can be verified off of U.S. Census Bureau data or other high quality government data sources.

Party identification is another thing entirely. Most fundamentally, it is an attitude, not a demographic. To put it simply, party identification is one of the aspects of public opinion that our surveys are trying to measure, not something that we know ahead of time like the share of adults who are African American, female, or who live in the South. Particularly in an election cycle, the balance of party identification in surveys will ebb and flow with candidate fortunes, as it should, since the candidates themselves are the defining figureheads of those partisan labels. Thus there is no timely, independent measure of the partisan balance that polls could use for a baseline adjustment.

These shifts in party identification are essential to understanding the dynamics of American politics. In the months after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, polls registered a substantial increase in the share of Americans calling themselves Republican. We saw similar shifts in the balance of party identification as the War in Iraq went on, and in the build-up to the Republicans’ 2010 midterm election victory. In all of those instances, had we tried to standardize the balance of party identification in our surveys to some prior levels, our surveys would have fundamentally missed what were significant changes in public opinion.

The clearest evidence of this is the accuracy of the Pew Research Center’s final election estimates. In every presidential election since 1996, our final pre-election surveys have aligned with the actual vote outcome, because we measured rising Democratic or Republican fortunes in each year.

In short, because party identification is so tightly intertwined with candidate preferences, any effort to constrain or affix the partisan balance of a survey would certainly smooth out any peaks and valleys in our survey trends, but would also lead us to miss more fundamental changes in the electorate that may be occurring. In effect, standardizing, smoothing, or otherwise tinkering with the balance of party identification in a survey is tantamount to saying we know how well each candidate is doing before the survey is conducted.

What follows is a more detailed overview of the properties of party identification – how it changes over the short- and long-term, and at both the aggregate and individual level. It also includes a detailed discussion of the distinction between registered voters and likely voters, and why trying to estimate likely voters at this point in the election cycle is problematic.

What is Party Affiliation?

Public opinion researchers generally consider party affiliation to be a psychological identification with one of the two major political parties. It is not the same thing as party registration. Not all states allow voters to register by party, and even in states that do, some people may be reluctant to publicly identify their politics by registering with a party, while others may feel they have to register with a party to participate in primaries that exclude unaffiliated voters. Thus, while party affiliation and party registration is likely to be the same for many people, it will not be the same for everyone.

Party affiliation is derived from a question, typically found at the end of a survey questionnaire, in which respondents are asked how they regard themselves in politics at the moment. In Pew Research Center surveys, the question asks: “In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?”

As the wording suggests, this question is intended to capture how people think of themselves currently, and people can change their personal allegiance easily. We continually see evidence of this in surveys that ask the same people about their party affiliation at two different points in time. In a post-election survey we conducted in November 2008, we interviewed voters with whom we had spoken less than one month earlier, in mid-October.

Among Republicans interviewed in October, 17% did not identify as Republicans in November. Among Democrats interviewed in October, 10% no longer identified as Democrats. Of those who declined to identify with a party in October, 18% told us they were either Democrats or Republicans when we interviewed them in November. Overall, 15% of voters gave a different answer in November than they did in October.

We also see party affiliation changing in understandable ways over time, in response to major events and political circumstances. For example, the percentage of registered voters identifying as Republican dropped from 33% to 28% between 2004 and 2007 during a period in which disapproval of President George W. Bush’s job performance was rising and opinions about the GOP were becoming increasingly negative.

Similarly, the percentage of American voters identifying as Democrats dropped from 38% in 2008 – a high point not seen since the 1980s – to 34% in 2011, after their large losses in the 2010 congressional elections. (For more about the fluidity of party affiliation, see Section 3 of the report, “Independents Oppose Party in Power… Again,” Sept. 23, 2010.)

The changeability of party affiliation is one key reason why Pew Research and most other public pollsters do not attempt to adjust their samples to match some independent estimate of the “true” balance of party affiliation in the country. In addition, unlike national parameters for characteristics such as gender, age, education and race, which can be derived from large government surveys, there is no independent estimate of party affiliation. Some critics argue that polls should be weighted to the distribution of party affiliation as documented by the exit polls in the most recent election. But the use of exit poll statistics for weighting current surveys has several problems.

First of all, a review of exit polls from the past four elections (including midterm elections) shows the same kind of variability in party affiliation that telephone opinion polls show. Why is an exit poll taken nearly two years earlier a more reliable guide to the current reality of party affiliation than our own survey taken right now?

Second, most pollsters sample the general public – even if they subsequently base their election estimates on registered voters or likely voters in that poll. But the exit polls are sampling voters. We know that the distribution of party affiliation is not the same among voters as it is among the general public or among all those who are registered to vote. How can the exit polls provide an accurate target for weighting a general public sample when they are based on only about half (or less) of the general public?

Registered Voters vs. Likely Voters

Another common question during election years is why we report on registered voters when we will ultimately base our election forecast on likely voters. We certainly understand that the best estimate of how the election will turn out is one that reflects the voting intentions of people who will actually vote. Most – but not all – people who are registered to vote cast a ballot in presidential election years. It is for this reason that pollsters, including Pew Research, make a substantial effort to identify who is a likely voter (For more details on how likely voters are determined, see “Identifying Likely Voters” in the methodology section of our website).

But, in the same way that party affiliation is not fixed for a given individual, being a “likely voter” is not a demographic characteristic like gender or race. Political campaigns are, in part, designed to mobilize supporters to vote. Although it may feel like the presidential campaign is in full swing, much of the hard work of mobilizing voters has not yet taken place and won’t occur until much closer to the election. Accordingly, any determination of who is a likely voter today – three months before the election – is apt to contain a significant amount of error. For this reason, Pew Research and many other polling organizations typically do not report on likely voters until September, after the nominating conventions have concluded and the campaign is fully underway.

Critics have argued that any poll based on registered voters is likely to be biased toward Democratic candidates, since likely voter screens tend to reduce the proportion of Democratic supporters relative to Republican supporters. This has been the case in Pew Research’s final election polls over the past four presidential elections. In these polls the vote margin has been, on average, five points more favorable to the Republican candidates when based on likely voters rather than registered voters. These final estimates of the outcome have generally been very accurate, especially when undecided respondents are allocated to the candidates.

Yet the effect of limiting the analysis to likely voters can vary over the course of the campaign cycle, even in just the later months. For example, in September and October of 2008, most Pew Research surveys found little difference between election estimates based on all registered voters and those we identified as most likely to vote, suggesting again that determining a likely voter gets more accurate only as Election Day nears.

As Americans head to the polls this November, their values and basic beliefs are more polarized along partisan lines than at any point in the past 25 years. Unlike in 1987, when this series of surveys began, the values gap between Republicans and Democrats is now greater than gender, age, race or class divides.

Overall, there has been much more stability than change across the 48 political values measures that the Pew Research Center has tracked since 1987. But the average partisan gap has nearly doubled over this 25-year period – from 10 percentage points in 1987 to 18 percentage points in the new study.

Nearly all of the increases have occurred during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. During this period, both parties’ bases have often been critical of their parties for not standing up for their traditional positions. Currently, 71% of Republicans and 58% of Democrats say their parties have not done a good job in this regard.

With regard to the broad spectrum of values, basic demographic divisions – along lines such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion and class – are no wider than they have ever been. Men and women, whites, blacks and Hispanics, the highly religious and the less religious, and those with more and less education differ in many respects. However, these differences have not grown in recent years, and for the most part pale in comparison to the overwhelming partisan divide we see today.

In recent years, both parties have become smaller and more ideologically homogeneous. Republicans are dominated by self-described conservatives, while a smaller but growing number of Democrats call themselves liberals. Among Republicans, conservatives continue to outnumber moderates by about two-to-one. And there are now as many liberal Democrats as moderate Democrats.

But the growing partisan divide over political values is not simply the result of the declining number who identify with the party labels. While many Americans have given up their party identification over the past 25 years and now call themselves independents, the polarization extends also to independents, most of whom lean toward a political party. Even when the definition of the party bases is extended to include these leaning independents, the values gap has about doubled between 1987 and 2012.

Looking ahead to the 2012 election, the largest divides between committed supporters of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney are over the scope and role of government in the economic realm. Swing voters, who make up about a quarter of all registered voters, are cross-pressured. Their attitudes on the social safety net and immigration are somewhat closer to those of Romney supporters, while they tilt closer to Obama supporters in opinions about labor unions and some social issues.

In contrast to the widening partisan gap, the new survey finds neither growing class differences in fundamental political values, nor increasing class resentment. As in the past, a substantial majority of Americans agree that “the rich just get richer while the poor get poorer.” Yet there are no indications of increasing hostility toward the rich and successful. And there are no signs that lower-income people have become more cynical about an individual’s power to control their destiny or the value of hard work.

At the same time, the proportion of Americans who see a widening gap in living standards between the poor and middle class has grown since the mid-1980s. But the public sees no greater gap in values differences between the middle class and poor over this period.

The polling finds little support for the broad notion of American “declinism.” As has been the case in previous political values surveys, a large majority agrees that “as Americans we can always find a way to solve our problems and get what we want.” The public’s confidence in the nation has not been dulled, even as Americans have become more skeptical about prospects for economic growth.

These are among the principal findings of the latest Pew Research Center American Values survey, conducted April 4-15, 2012, among 3,008 adults nationwide. The values project, which began in 1987 and has been updated 14 times since then, tracks a wide range of the public’s fundamental beliefs. These questions do not measure opinions about specific policy or political questions, but rather the underlying values that ultimately shape those opinions.

Widening Gaps over Social Safety Net, Environmentalism

The survey covers the public’s attitudes on the role and performance of government, the environment, business, labor, equal opportunity, national security and several other dimensions.

Republicans are most distinguished by their increasingly minimalist views about the role of government and lack of support for environmentalism. Democrats have become more socially liberal and secular. Republicans and Democrats are most similar in their level of political engagement.

On some sets of issues, such as views of the social safety net, there already were sizable partisan gaps in Pew Research’s first political values study in 1987. But these differences have widened considerably. On others, such as measures of religiosity and social conservatism, there were only modest differences initially, but these divides also have grown.

Republicans and Democrats are furthest apart in their opinions about the social safety net. There are partisan differences of 35 points or more in opinions about the government’s responsibility to care for the poor, whether the government should help more needy people if it means adding to the debt and whether the government should guarantee all citizens enough to eat and a place to sleep.

On all three measures, the percentage of Republicans asserting a government responsibility to aid the poor has fallen in recent years to 25-year lows.

Just 40% of Republicans agree that “It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can’t take care of themselves,” down 18 points since 2007. In three surveys during the George W. Bush administration, no fewer than half of Republicans said the government had a responsibility to care for those unable to care for themselves. In 1987, during the Ronald Reagan’s second term, 62% expressed this view.

Over the past two decades, the public consensus in favor of tougher environmental restrictions has weakened, also primarily because of changing opinions among Republicans.

For the first time in a Pew Research Center political values survey, only about half of Republicans (47%) agree that “there needs to be stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment.” This represents a decline of 17 points since 2009 and a fall of nearly 40 points, from 86%, since 1992.

The partisan gap over this measure was modest two decades ago. Today, roughly twice as many Democrats as Republicans say stricter environmental laws and regulations are needed (93% vs. 47%).

Democrats More Secular, Socially Liberal

Yet the widening partisan divide in political values is not just the result of changing opinions among Republicans. Democrats have shifted their views in a number of areas in recent years, though less dramatically: They have become more secular, more positive in their views of immigrants and more supportive of policies aimed at achieving equal opportunity.

Roughly three-quarters of Democrats (77%) say they “never doubt the existence of God,” as do 76% of independents. The proportion of Democrats saying they never doubt God’s existence has fallen 11 points over the past decade. Among white Democrats, the decline has been 17 points – from 85% in 2002 to 68% currently.

Independents also are less likely to express firm belief in God than in the past. By contrast, the percentage of Republicans saying they never doubt God’s existence is as large today (92%) as it was a decade ago, or a quarter century ago.

There also has been a substantial decline in the share of Democrats saying they “have old-fashioned values about family and marriage.” Just 60% of Democrats currently agree, down from 70% in 2007 and 86% in the first political values survey. Republicans’ views have shown far less change: Currently, 88% say they have old-fashioned values about marriage and family.

Democratic support for doing whatever is necessary to improve the position of minorities, including the possible use of preferences, has increased in recent years. About half (52%) of Democrats agree that “We should make every effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities, even if it means giving them preferential treatment” – an 11-point increase since 2007.

Republicans’ views have changed little over this period. Just 12% currently agree that all efforts should be taken, including the use of preferential treatment, to improve the position of minorities. Since 1987, the gap between the two parties has about doubled – from 18 points to 40 points.

Class Divides: No Wider than in 1987

While the partisan gaps in political values have increased substantially, class divisions have not. This does not mean there are not significant differences, particularly when it comes to views about whether hard work leads to success and whether success is within an individual’s control. But these differences are generally no wider today than in recent years, or than they were in the initial political values survey.

For the past 25 years, majorities across most groups have rejected the idea that “hard work offers little guarantee of success.” In the current survey, just 35% agree with this statement while 63% disagree. As in the past, those with less education and lower incomes are more likely than those with more education and higher incomes to say that hard work does not ensure success.

Currently, 45% of those with no more than a high school education agree that hard work offers little guarantee of success, compared with 25% of college graduates. The gap was about as large in Pew Research’s first political values study (35% vs.17%).

Among whites who have not completed college, 36% are skeptical that hard work guarantees success; fewer white college graduates agree (24%). The education gap among whites was comparable in 1987 (29% non-college grad, 16% college grad).

There is greater agreement across socioeconomic lines in views of the gap between the rich and poor in this country.

As has been the case in most values surveys, majorities in all educational and income groups agree that “today it’s really true that the rich just get richer while the poor get poorer.” In the current survey, 76% of the public agrees with this statement, about the same as the 74% that agreed in 1987.

Still, there is evidence that the public sees greater economic inequality today than it did in the 1980s. About six-in-ten (61%) say the gap in living standards between middle class and poor people has widened over the past 10 years, while just 28% say it has narrowed.

In a 1986 survey by Gallup and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, just 40% said the gap in the standard of living between the middle class and poor had grown, while about as many (39%) said it had narrowed.

Yet there has been far less change in opinions about whether the values of middle class and poor people are growing apart. In the current survey, 47% say the values of the middle class and poor have gotten more similar over the past 10 years; somewhat fewer (41%) say they have gotten more different. That is little changed from the 1986 survey, when 44% said the values of each had gotten more similar and 33% more different.

Economic Views Sour, But No Decline in Optimism

The survey also finds new evidence of the toll taken by the economic downturn, both on people’s personal financial assessments and their views of the country’s economic prospects. Just 53% say they are “pretty well satisfied with the way things are going for me financially.” That matches the lowest percentage ever, reached three years ago. People with family incomes of $75,000 or more express greater satisfaction with their finances than in 2009; financial satisfaction has continued to sag among those with incomes of less than $40,000.

Only about half of Americans (51%) agree with this statement: “I don’t believe that there are any real limits to growth in this country today”; 45% disagree. That is the lowest percentage ever agreeing with this statement, down slightly from 54% in 2009. In the first political values survey, 67% said there were no limits to growth in the United States.

Despite persistent economic pessimism, however, the public remains bullish about the ability of the American people to overcome challenges. Nearly seven-in-ten (69%) agree that “As Americans, we can always find a way to solve our problems and get what we want.” While that is largely unchanged from 2009 (70%), it is up 11 points since 2007 (58%). It also is about the same percentage that agreed with this statement in the first values survey (68%).

Political Values and the 2012 Election

When the values items are combined into indices (grouping measures on common subjects, such as the social safety net, into a single scale), swing voters – who make up 23% of all registered voters – tend to fall about halfway between certain Obama voters and certain Romney voters. Swing voters are either undecided, only lean toward a candidate, or favor a candidate but say there is still a chance they will change their minds.  (For more, see “With Voters Focused on Economy, Obama Lead Narrows,” April 17, 2012).

On views about the scope and performance of government, for example, there is a wide divide between certain Obama and Romney supporters. But the attitudes of swing voters are about equidistant from backers of either candidate. The same is true on several other key indices, including views of business, the environment and national security.

Nonetheless, there are some issues on which the views of swing voters tilt slightly toward the backers of either candidate. On attitudes toward labor and social conservatism, opinion among swing voters comes somewhat closer to that of Obama voters. By contrast, on indices measuring attitudes on the social safety net and immigration, swing voters’ opinions tilt toward those of Romney supporters.

While the views of swing voters generally fall between those of certain Obama and Romney backers, there are a handful of individual questions that show agreement between swing voters and the supporters of one candidate or the other.

For example, on the power of labor unions and admiration of wealthy people, the opinions of swing voters are closer to those of Obama supporters. About half of swing voters (51%) agree that labor unions have too much power, placing them closer to the views of Obama supporters (39% agree) than Romney supporters (82%).

Just 22% of swing voters, and an identical percentage of Obama supporters, say they “admire people who are rich.” A much higher percentage of Romney supporters (38%) agree.

But swing voters are far closer to Romney voters on the question of whether the government should help more needy people even if it means going further into debt: just 19% of Romney voters and 27% of swing voters agree, compared with a 62% majority of Obama voters.

Number of Independents Continues to Grow

While Republicans and Democrats have been moving further apart in their beliefs, both groups have also been shrinking. Pew Research Center polling conducted so far in 2012 has found fewer Americans affiliating with one of the major parties than at any point in the past 25 years. And looking at data from Gallup going back to 1939, it is safe to say that there are more political independents in 2012 than at any point in the last 75 years.

Currently, 38% of Americans identify as independents, while 32% affiliate with the Democratic Party and 24% affiliate with the GOP. That is little changed from recent years, but long-term trends show that both parties have lost support.

The percentage of Americans identifying as Democrats increased from 31% in 2002, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, to 36% in 2008. But over the past four years, Democratic affiliation has fallen to 32%. Republican identification stood at 30% in 2002, but fell to 25% in 2008 and has not recovered since then.

More Conservative Republicans, More Liberal Democrats

Over the past decade, the Republican Party has come to be dominated by conservatives, while liberals make up an increasing share of Democrats.

In surveys conducted this year, 68% of Republicans describe themselves as politically conservative. That is little changed from 2008, but is higher than in 2004 (63%) or 2000 (60%).

Demographically, Republicans remain overwhelmingly white and their average age now approaches 50. Fully 87% of Republicans are non-Hispanic whites, a figure which has changed little since 2000.

Meanwhile, the percentage of Democrats who say their political views are liberal has risen from 28% in 2000 to 34% in 2008 and 38% in 2012 surveys by the Pew Research Center. For the first time, there are as many liberal Democrats as moderate Democrats.

In contrast to Republicans, Democrats have grown increasingly diverse. A narrow majority of Democrats (55%) are non-Hispanic whites, down from 64% in 2000. As in recent years, most Democrats are women (59%). And while the average age of self-described Democrats has risen since 2008 – from 46.9 to 47.7 – Democrats continue to be younger than Republicans on average (47.7 vs. 49.7).

Independents also have become more diverse since 2000: Two-thirds of independents (67%) are non-Hispanic whites, down 12 points from 2000. The proportion of independents who are Hispanic has nearly doubled – from 9% to 16% – over this period.

A plurality of independents (43%) describes their views as moderate, while 30% are conservative and 22% are liberal. These views are largely unchanged from previous election years.

Though voters’ views of the ideologies of the political parties have shifted little since the summer of 2010, an increasing number see the Republican Party as very conservative, while slightly fewer see the Democratic Party as very liberal.

In 2010, somewhat more, on balance, viewed the Democratic Party as very liberal than said the GOP was very conservative (26% vs. 18%). Currently, nearly identical percentages view the Democratic Party as very liberal and the Republican Party as very conservative (22%, 23% respectively).

This trend notwithstanding, many Republicans’ own ideological assessments fall to the right of the assessments they give to the GOP.  Nearly four-in-ten (38%) Republican voters rate own ideology as more conservative than their impression of the Republican Party’s ideology.

Overall, perceptions of the parties’ ideologies are little changed from June 2010. Six-in-ten (60%) say the Republican Party is either very conservative or conservative, while 54% say the Democratic Party is either very liberal or liberal. In June 2010, 56% saw the GOP as conservative or very conservative and 58% saw the Democrats as liberal or very liberal.

The latest survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, conducted Aug. 17-21 among 1,509 adults (1,205 registered voters), finds that voters’ descriptions of their own political views also are little changed. Roughly four-in-ten (41%) say they are either very conservative (8%) or conservative (33%), while about half as many (19%) say they are either very liberal (5%) or liberal (14%); another 38% describe themselves as moderate.

Looking at the ideological perceptions of the parties and voters’ descriptions of themselves, voters on average place themselves just right of center and slightly closer to the Republican Party than to the Democratic Party.

Republican voters see themselves as somewhat more conservative than they see their party – and they see the Democrats as solidly liberal. These perceptions are amplified among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents who agree with the Tea Party.

Democrats, by contrast, view their party’s political views as moderate. On average, Democrats’ own ideological assessments place them close to the middle of the political spectrum.

Partisans Rate Their Own Ideology

A large majority of Republican registered voters (73%) describe their political views as either conservative (55%) or very conservative (18%). About a quarter (24%) say their views are moderate, while very few (3%) say their views are liberal or very liberal.

Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independent voters who agree with the Tea Party movement, 84% say they are either conservative (61%) or very conservative (23%); just 14% describe their views as moderate. Republicans who disagree or have no opinion of the Tea Party are more divided: 51% say they are either conservative (44%) or very conservative (7%) and 41% see themselves as moderate.

Among Democrats, 41% describe their views as moderate, 32% say they are liberal (including 9% who say they are very liberal) and 23% say they are conservative.

Nearly half of independents (47%) say their political views are moderate, about the same as last year. The remainder tilt conservative, with 33% saying they are either conservative (29%) or very conservative (4%); 17% say their views are either liberal (14%) or very liberal (3%).

Many Republicans Place GOP to the Left of Their Own Views

Voters were asked to rate their own political views – and the parties’ political views –  on the same scale, from very conservative to very liberal.  This makes it possible to compare voters’ own views with their assessments of the parties’ ideologies.

As in June 2010, about half of registered voters (52%) rate their own political views as more conservative than the rating they give the Democratic Party. Fewer voters (42%) see their own ideology as more liberal than the Republican Party’s.

Many Republican voters – particularly those who agree with the Tea Party – place themselves to the right of the GOP ideologically. Nearly four-in-ten Republican voters (38%) rate their own views as more conservative than the Republican Party’s. Just 19% see the GOP’s views as more liberal than their own, while 42% say the Republican Party’s ideology is about the same as their own.

Among Republicans and Republican-leaning voters who agree with the Tea Party, half (50%) place the GOP’s political views to the left of their own. Just 11% see the GOP as more conservative while 37% view the Republican Party’s views as similar to their own. By contrast, just 23% of Republicans and Republican leaners who do not agree with the Tea Party rate the GOP’s ideology as more liberal than their own, while 42% say the party’s views are about the same as their own and 33% see the GOP’s ideology as more conservative than their own.

Democratic voters are about as likely as Republican voters to say their own views are similar to their party’s (38% of Democrats, 42% of Republicans). Comparable percentages of Democrats say their own views are more liberal (31%), or more conservative (24%), than the party’s.

As the country enters into the 2012 presidential election cycle, the electorate’s partisan affiliations have shifted significantly since Barack Obama won office nearly three years ago. In particular, the Democrats hold a much narrower edge than they did in 2008, particularly when the partisan leanings of independents are taken into account.

Notably, the GOP gains have occurred only among white voters; a 2-point Republican edge among whites in 2008 (46% to 44%) has widened to a 13-point lead today (52% to 39%). In sharp contrast, the partisan attachments of black and Hispanic voters have remained consistently Democratic.

While Republican gains in leaned party identification span nearly all subgroups of whites, they are particularly pronounced among the young and poor. A seven-point Democratic advantage among whites under age 30 three years ago has turned into an 11-point GOP advantage today. And a 15-point Democratic advantage among whites earning less than $30,000 annually has swung to a slim four-point Republican edge today.

Yet, the Republican Party’s growth has been limited in two important ways. First, the steep gains in GOP leaning that helped the party in the 2010 midterms have not continued, as the overall balance of partisan attachments has held steady in the first half of 2011. Second, while more independents say they “lean” toward the Republican Party, the GOP has not gained in actual party affiliation since 2008 – just 28% of registered voters, in both years, call themselves Republicans. Instead, the growth category continues to be political independents, with a record high 34% of registered voters choosing this label in 2011.

Tracking Party Identification and Party Leaning

Analysis of the overall balance of partisan identification in all Pew Research Center polling conducted in each year – updated with data from the first six months of 2011 –finds that as the number of Democrats has fallen from a quarter-century high in 2008, the number of self-proclaimed independents has continued to grow. As a result, there are now as many independent voters as Democrats (34% each) – the first time this has occurred in more than two decades of Pew Research Center surveys, and, by all indications, the highest percent independent since party identification was first measured in the late 1930s.

While the number identifying as Republicans has remained relatively flat (28% in both 2008 and 2011), more independent voters lean to the GOP than did so in 2008 (16% now, 11% then). When leaners are combined with partisans, Democrats only have a four-point advantage among registered voters – 47% of voters are Democrats or lean to the Democratic Party while 43% are Republicans or lean to the GOP. In 2008, Democrats held a 12 point advantage over Republicans (51% to 39%).

Most of this shift in the balance of partisan attachment occurred prior to this year. The sharp gains in Republican leanings between 2009 and 2010 have not continued into the first half of 2011. [See detailed table at back of report for a full demographic breakdown of party identification in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.]

Republicans have made sizable gains among white voters since 2008. Currently, 52% of white voters either identify as Republicans or lean to the GOP, compared with 39% who affiliate with the Democratic Party or lean Democratic. In 2008, Republicans held only a two-point lead among white voters (46% to 44%).

There has been no change in party identification among African American or Hispanic voters. Large majorities of African American (86%) and Hispanic voters (64%) continue to identify as Democrats or lean Democratic.

The Democratic Party’s advantage among young voters has declined from 28 points in 2008 to 13 in the first half of 2011. The Democrats’ edge among voters ages 30 to 64 also has narrowed (from 10 points to three points). And Republicans now hold a two-point lead among voters 65 and older (47% to 45%); Democrats held an eight-point lead among seniors in 2008 (49% to 41%).

Republicans also have made gains among both men and women. In surveys conducted through June, Republicans have a four-point advantage among men (47% to 43%) and trail by 12 points among women (52% to 40%). In 2008, Democrats held a two-point edge among men and a 21-point advantage among women

Republican gains have been substantial among voters with family incomes under $75,000. Notably, Democrats held a 12-point advantage among middle income voters ($30,000-$74,999) in 2008, but now as many identify with the Republican Party as with the Democratic Party. Democrats continue to maintain their advantage among lower income voters, but it is smaller now than in 2008.

GOP Gains among Young White Voters

The Republican Party’s wide lead among white voters is not unprecedented. The current 12-point advantage in leaned party affiliation among whites is on par with the GOPs lead among whites from 2002-2004 and in 1994. And as with the national trend, there has been virtually no shift in partisanship among whites from 2010 to the first half of 2011.

Unlike 2008, Republicans now have the advantage across virtually all groups of white voters. Most notably, Republicans now have an 11-point lead over Democrats (52% to 41%) among whites under the age of 30. In 2008, Democrats held a seven-point edge among this group (49% to 42%).

While the GOP’s gains have been particularly evident among young whites, they have picked up support across all age groups as well. Among white voters ages 30 to 49, the Republican lead over Democrats has grown from seven points to 19 points. Among voters ages 50 to 64, who were evenly split in 2008, Republicans now have a nine-point advantage. The GOP’ had a slight 2-point edge among white voters 65 and older three years ago; that has increased to 12 points in the first half of 2011.

Republicans also have widened their advantage among white men from 11 points in 2008 to 21 points now. Republicans now have a five-point lead among white women; in 2008 Democrats had a seven-point lead over Republicans among white women voters.

Democrats have lost their edge among lower income white voters. In 2008, Democrats had a 15 point lead among white voters with family incomes less than $30,000. Republicans now have a four-point edge among this group. The GOP’s lead among middle income white voters also has grown since 2008, and Republicans maintain a substantial advantage with higher income white voters.

Republicans have made gains among whites with a high school education or less. The GOP’s advantage over Democrats has grown from one point in 2008 to 17 points in 2011 among less educated whites. Republicans have made smaller gains among whites voters who have college degrees.

Generations: Fewer Millennials Leaning Democratic

The Millennial generation – those born after 1980 – were a topic of much discussion in the 2008 election. These young voters – the oldest turned 27 that year, and are turning 30 now – leaned Democratic by roughly two-to-one in the 2008 election, and their commitment to Barack Obama, and relatively high voter turnout, was a substantial factor in the election’s outcome.

While these voters remain the most Democratically oriented generation today, the advantage has narrowed substantially since 2008. Currently, 52% of Millennial voters are Democrats or lean to the Democratic Party while 39% are Republicans or lean to the GOP. This 13-point edge is less than half the size of the 32-point edge Democrats held three years ago.

Among voters in other generations, Democrats have lost adherents while Republicans have gained. But these changes have not been as large as those among Millennials.

With the economy still struggling and the nation involved in multiple military operations overseas, the public’s political mood is fractious. In this environment, many political attitudes have become more doctrinaire at both ends of the ideological spectrum, a polarization that reflects the current atmosphere in Washington.

Yet at the same time, a growing number of Americans are choosing not to identify with either political party, and the center of the political spectrum is increasingly diverse. Rather than being moderate, many of these independents hold extremely strong ideological positions on issues such as the role of government, immigration, the environment and social issues. But they combine these views in ways that defy liberal or conservative orthodoxy.

For political leaders in both parties, the challenge is not only one of appeasing ideological and moderate “wings” within their coalitions, but rather holding together remarkably disparate groups, many of whom have strong disagreements with core principles that have defined each party’s political character in recent years.

The most visible shift in the political landscape since Pew Research’s previous political typology in early 2005 is the emergence of a single bloc of across-the-board conservatives. The long-standing divide between economic, pro-business conservatives and social conservatives has blurred. Today, Staunch Conservatives take extremely conservative positions on nearly all issues – on the size and role of government, on economics, foreign policy, social issues and moral concerns. Most agree with the Tea Party and even more very strongly disapprove of Barack Obama’s job performance. A second core group of Republicans – Main Street Republicans – also is conservative, but less consistently so.

On the left, Solid Liberals express diametrically opposing views from the Staunch Conservatives on virtually every issue. While Solid Liberals are predominantly white, minorities make up greater shares of New Coalition Democrats – who include nearly equal numbers 0f whites, African Americans and Hispanics – and Hard-Pressed Democrats, who are about a third African American. Unlike Solid Liberals, both of these last two groups are highly religious and socially conservative. New Coalition Democrats are distinguished by their upbeat attitudes in the face of economic struggles.

Independents have played a determinative role in the last three national elections. But the three groups in the center of the political typology have very little in common, aside from their avoidance of partisan labels. Libertarians and Post-Moderns are largely white, well-educated and affluent. They also share a relatively secular outlook on some social issues, including homosexuality and abortion. But Republican-oriented Libertarians are far more critical of government, less supportive of environmental regulations, and more supportive of business than are Post-Moderns, most of whom lean Democratic.

Disaffecteds, the other main group of independents, are financially stressed and cynical about politics. Most lean to the Republican Party, though they differ from the core Republican groups in their support for increased government aid to the poor. Another group in the center, Bystanders, largely consign themselves to the political sidelines and for the most part are not included in this analysis.

These are the principal findings of the political typology study by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, which sorts Americans into cohesive groups based on values, political beliefs, and party affiliation. The new study is based on two surveys with a combined sample of 3,029 adults, conducted Feb. 22-Mar. 14, 2011 and a smaller callback survey conducted April 7-10, 2011 with 1,432 of the same respondents.

This is the fifth typology created by the Pew Research Center since 1987. Many of the groups identified in the current analysis are similar to those in past typologies, reflecting the continuing importance of a number of key beliefs and values. But there are a number of critical differences as well.

The new groupings underscore the substantial political changes that have occurred since the spring of 2005, when the previous typology was released. Today, there are two core Republican groups, compared with three in 2005, to some extent reflecting a decline in GOP party affiliation. However, Democrats have not made gains in party identification. Rather, there has been a sharp rise in the percentage of independents – from 30% in 2005 to 37% currently. Today, there are three disparate groups of independents, compared with two in 2005.

While Republicans trail the Democrats in party affiliation, they enjoy advantages in other areas: The two core GOP groups are more homogenous – demographically and ideologically – than are the three core Democratic groups. And socioeconomic differences are more apparent on the left: Nearly half of Solid Liberals (49%) are college graduates, compared with 27% of New Coalition Democrats and just 13% of Hard-Pressed Democrats.

The GOP still enjoys an intensity advantage, which proved to be a crucial factor in the Republicans’ victories in the 2010 midterm elections. For example, the GOP’s core groups – Staunch Conservatives and Main Street Republicans – express strongly negative opinions about last year’s health care legislation, while reactions among the Democratic groups are more mixed. Even Solid Liberals offer only tepid support for the bill – 43% say it will have a mostly positive impact on the nation’s health care, while somewhat more (51%) say it will have a mixed effect.

However, maintaining solid support among the GOP-oriented groups in the center of the typology represents a formidable challenge for Republicans. The cross-pressured Disaffecteds highlight this challenge. They were an important part of the GOP coalition in 2010, but were lackluster supporters of John McCain two years earlier.

Like the core GOP groups, most Disaffecteds (73%) view government as nearly always wasteful and inefficient. At the same time, a solid majority of Disaffecteds (61%) say the government should do more to help needy Americans even if that means going deeper into debt.

Libertarians, the other Republican-leaning group, overwhelmingly oppose expanding aid for the poor if it means increasing the nation’s debt. Yet on immigration and homosexuality, Libertarians’ views differ markedly from those of the core Republican groups. Fully 71% of Libertarians say homosexuality should be accepted by society; nearly as many Staunch Conservatives (68%) say it should be discouraged.

Many of the political values and attitudes of Post-Moderns, young, Democratically-oriented independents, fit awkwardly with those of core Democratic groups. Post-Moderns overwhelmingly voted for Obama in 2008, but their turnout fell off dramatically last fall, which contributed to the Democrats’ poor showing in the midterms. Compared with the core Democratic groups, Post-Moderns are less supportive of increased aid for the needy and are far less likely to view racial discrimination as the main obstacle to African American progress.

Partisan Dividing Line: Views of Government

The new typology finds a deep and continuing divide between the two parties, as well as differences within both partisan coalitions. But the nature of the partisan divide has changed substantially over time.

More than in the recent past, attitudes about government separate Democrats from Republicans, and it is these beliefs that are most correlated with political preferences looking ahead to 2012. In 2005, at the height of the Iraq war and shortly after an election in which national security was a dominant issue, opinions about assertiveness in foreign affairs almost completely distinguished Democrats from Republicans. Partisan divisions over national security remain, but in an era when the public’s focus is more inward-looking, they are less pronounced.

As in recent years, beliefs about the environment, business, immigration and the challenges faced by African Americans are important fissures between the parties, though to some extent within them as well.

In general, there is far more agreement across the two core GOP groups than the three core Democratic groups. Staunch Conservatives and Main Street Republicans express highly critical opinions about government performance and are both deeply skeptical of increased government aid to the poor if it means adding to the debt.

Yet Staunch Conservatives have much more positive opinions about business than do Main Street Republicans. Attitudes about the environment also divide the two core GOP groups: 92% of Staunch Conservatives say that stricter environmental laws cost too many jobs and hurt the economy; just 22% of Main Street Republicans agree.

The differences among core Democratic groups show up across a wider range of fundamental political values. Social and moral issues divide Solid Liberals, who are more secular, from other Democratic groups who are much more religious.

Opinions about business, immigration and the economic impact of environmental laws and regulations also divide the Democratic groups. For instance, more than half of Hard-Pressed Democrats (54%) say that stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy; just 22% of New Coalition Democrats and 7% of Solid Liberals share this view.

Race and ethnicity are factors in some of the opinion differences among Democrats. New Coalition Democrats, who are roughly a quarter Hispanic, have positive views of immigrants. Fully 70% say immigrants strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents.

Hard-Pressed Democrats – who are mostly white and African American – take a dim view of immigrants’ contributions. Just 13% say immigrants strengthen the country, while 76% say they are a burden because they take jobs and health care.

Age also is a factor in partisanship and political values. Younger people are more numerous on the left, and older people on the right. However, many young people think of themselves as independents rather than as Democrats. Post-Moderns, Democratic-oriented independents, are by far the youngest group in the typology, but they often deviate from traditional Democratic orthodoxy and are not consistent voters.

Older people, who have increasingly voted Republican in recent years, are found disproportionately in the Staunch Conservative bloc – 61% are 50 or older. And this group is highly politically engaged; 75% say they follow government and public affairs most of the time.

Staunch Conservatives also include by far the largest share of Tea Party supporters – 72% of Staunch Conservatives agree with the movement. The Tea Party’s appeal is deeper than it is wide. There is no other typology group in which a majority agrees with the Tea Party. Aside from Staunch Conservatives, Libertarians are most supportive (44% agree).

The survey suggests that while the Tea Party is a galvanizing force on the right, strong disapproval of Barack Obama is an even more powerful unifying factor among fervent conservatives. No fewer than 84% of Staunch Conservatives strongly disapprove of Obama’s job performance and 70% rate him very unfavorably personally. Ardent support for Obama on the left is no match for this – 64% of Solid Liberals strongly approve of him, and 45% rate him very favorably.

More than two years into office, Obama’s personal image is positive though his job approval ratings are mixed. Yet doubts about Obama’s background and biography persist. More than one-in-five Americans (23%) say, incorrectly, that Obama was born outside the United States; another 22% are not sure where Obama was born. Nearly half of Staunch Conservatives (47%) and 35% of Main Street Republicans say that Obama was born in another country. Only among Solid Liberals is there near total agreement that Obama was, in fact, born in the United States (95%). (NOTE: The survey was conducted before President Obama released his long-form birth certificate on April 27.)

Other Major Findings

• Majorities in most typology groups say the country will need both to cut spending and raise taxes to reduce the budget deficit. Staunch Conservatives are the exception – 59% say the focus should only be on cutting spending.
• Core GOP groups largely prefer elected officials who stick to their positions rather than those who compromise. Solid Liberals overwhelmingly prefer officials who compromise, but the other two Democratic groups do not.
• For Staunch Conservatives it is still “Drill, Baby, Drill” – 72% say that expanding exploration for and production of oil, coal and natural gas is the more important energy priority. In most other typology groups, majorities say developing alternatives is more important.
• Republican groups say the Supreme Court should base rulings on its interpretation of the Constitution “as originally written.” Democratic groups say the Court should base its rulings on what the Constitution means today.
• Main Street Republicans and GOP-oriented Disaffecteds are far more likely than Staunch Conservatives or Libertarians to favor a significant government role in reducing childhood obesity.
• Solid Liberals are the only typology group in which a majority (54%) views democracy as more important than stability in the Middle East. Other groups say stable governments are more important or are divided on this question.
• New Coalition Democrats are more likely than the other core Democratic groups to say that most people can make it if they are willing to work hard.
• More Staunch Conservatives regularly watch Fox News than regularly watch CNN, MSNBC and the nightly network news broadcasts combined.
• There are few points on which all the typology groups can agree, but cynicism about politicians is one. Majorities across all eight groups, as well as Bystanders, say elected officials lose touch with the people pretty quickly.
• Staunch Conservatives overwhelmingly want to get tougher with China on economic issues. Across other typology groups, there is far more support for building stronger economic relations with China.
• The allied airstrikes in Libya divide Democratic groups. Solid Liberals and New Coalition Democrats favor the airstrikes, but about as many Hard-Pressed Democrats favor as oppose the operation.
• Michelle Obama is popular with Main Street Republicans, as well as most other typology groups. But Staunch Conservatives view the first lady unfavorably – and 43% view her very unfavorably.

Making the Typology

The 2011 typology divides the public into eight politically engaged groups, along with a ninth group of less engaged Bystanders. It is the fifth of its kind, following on previous studies in 1987, 1994, 1999 and 2005.

Using a statistical procedure called cluster analysis, individuals are assigned to one of the eight core typology groups based on their position on nine scales of social and political values – each of which is determined by responses to two or three survey questions – as well as their party identification. Several different cluster solutions were evaluated for their effectiveness in producing cohesive groups that are distinct from one another, substantively meaningful and large enough in size to be analytically practical. The final solution selected to produce the political typology was judged to be strongest from a statistical point of view and to be most persuasive from a substantive point of view. As in past typologies, a measure of political attentiveness and voting participation was used to extract the “Bystander” group, people who are largely not engaged or involved in politics, before performing the cluster analysis.

For a more complete description of the methodology used to create the typology, see About the Political Typology. For more information about the survey methodology seen About the Surveys.