Last week was typical: In the Pew Research Center’s weekly News Interest Index, just 17% said they were following news about economic problems in Europe very closely. Just 3% cited this as their top story of the week. By comparison, 40% tracked U.S. economic news very closely and 20% said they followed it more closely than any other story.

A week earlier, nearly four times as many said the death of football player Junior Seau was their top story than cited Europe’s economic problems (11% vs. 3%).

In part, the public’s lack of interest Europe’s woes is part of a broader indifference to international news. Last year, there were a number of breakthrough foreign stories, from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan to the “Arab spring.” Not this year. Aside from the deadly crash of a cruise ship off the coast of Italy in January, no international story has come close to topping the weekly news interest index.

The public does not believe Europe’s financial crisis presents much of a threat to the U.S. economy. Last December, Pew Research asked about the seriousness of several possible threats to the U.S. economy. Fully 76% said the size of the national debt posed a major threat to U.S. economic well-being. Fewer than half (46%) said Europe’s economic problems represented a major threat. In terms of foreign threats, far more viewed economic competition from China as a major concern than the European crisis.

There were wide partisan differences over several possible economic threats, but not the Europe crisis. Only about half of Republicans and independents (49% each) said Europe’s economic problems represented a major threat to U.S. well-being, as did 43% of Democrats.

A new Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project survey finds that just 50 per cent of Russians approve of multi-party politics and half consider it a misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists. By a margin of 57 to 32 per cent, Russians believe that having a “strong leader” is more important than a democratic government.

This is the conviction that, for more than a decade, fuelled the popularity of Vladimir Putin, but is now beginning to pall. His “look-at-me” style appeared when the economy was on the rise but a combination of inflation and stagnant living standards is prompting many Russian voters once again to signal their unhappiness with the status quo. This search for leaders who will deliver economically holds an important lesson for the Middle East where the democratic tide still swells despite panicked opposition from some and the efforts of others to regulate its tempo.

Writing in the Financial Times, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Pew Research Center President Andrew Kohut assess Russia’s struggles in trying to make the transition to a more open society and what principles for nurturing democracy it suggests for the countries in the Middle East swept up by this year’s Arab Spring.

See the full article (registration required) and also the Pew Global Attitudes Project’s latest report, Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union.

Throughout the world, there is a tension in opinion brought on by the push and pull of globalization. Strong majorities in all regions believe that increased global interconnectedness is a good thing. But globalization is more popular among the youth of the world. Everywhere but Latin America, young people are more likely than their elders to see advantages in increased global trade and communication, and they are more likely to embrace “globalization” per se¹. This hesitation among some older citizens to embrace the movement toward globalization may be due in part to latent nationalism. Trend data from the World Values Survey², in successive surveys over the past 20 years, show that for the last two decades older people in the U.S. and throughout Western Europe have consistently expressed more national pride than a generation of older citizens.

Whose Culture is Best?

The Global Attitudes survey shows that people all over the world and of all ages are proud of their cultures. Yet it is only in the West (North America and Western Europe) where that pride is markedly stronger among the older generations, while younger people tend to be less wedded to their cultural identities.

In the U.S., 68% of those ages 65 and older agree with the statement “our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior,” while only 49% of those ages 18-29 agree. The generation gap in Western Europe is similar. More than half of older Western Europeans (53%) are culturally chauvinistic, compared with only one-in-three (32%) of their younger counterparts. The difference between generations is particularly apparent in France, where only 21% of those under age 30 support the notion of cultural superiority while 56% of those aged 65 and older say French culture is superior.

Eastern Europeans overall are more likely than their Western counterparts to say that their culture is superior. However, generational differences are not as sharp or as consistent as those seen in the US and Western Europe. In Bulgaria, Russia and Ukraine, citizens of all ages agree about the superiority of their respective cultures. In the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovak Republic, there are differences in perspective across age groups.

In Africa and Latin America, strong majorities, cutting across almost all ages, believe their culture is superior. In Asia, feelings of cultural superiority are even more intense. There are no major generation gaps in the region, except in Japan, where 84% of older people think that their culture is superior, compared with only 56% of those under age 30 who hold that view.

Protecting “Our Way of Life”

Despite the general attraction of globalization and possibly, as a reflection of their sense of cultural superiority, solid majorities everywhere think that their way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence. In most parts of the world, that desire cuts across all age groups. However, in the U.S., Western Europe and parts of Eastern Europe, older people are much more worried than the young about defending their country’s way of life.

In the U.S., seven-in-ten (71%) people ages 65 and older want to shield their way of life from foreign influence, while just over half (55%) of those ages 18 to 29 agree. This generation gap is even greater in France, Germany and Britain, where older people are twice as likely as young people to be worried about erosion of their way of life. Generational differences are less consistent in Eastern Europe. Concern is greatest among older people in Russia and Ukraine, while young Czechs are more worried than their elders about foreign influence.

Africans, Asians, Latin Americans and people living in the Middle East are generally even more worried than Americans and Europeans about a pernicious foreign influence on their way of life, but that concern is broadly shared across generations, with little significant difference between age groups.

Putting the Brakes on Immigration

Skepticism about foreign influence is evident in widespread, intense antipathy toward immigration. Majorities in nearly every country surveyed support tougher restrictions on people entering their countries. Immigrants are particularly unpopular across Europe, especially among the older generation, where half of those surveyed completely agree with the need for additional immigration controls. The anti-immigrant generation gap is widest in France, where more than half (53%) of those ages 65 and older completely agree that immigration should be restricted. Only a quarter (24%) of younger French men and women shared such strong views.

Anti-immigrant sentiment also runs high in the United States, especially among older Americans. Half (50%) of those ages 65 and older strongly support new controls on entry of people into the country. Only four-in-ten (40%) young people share that intensity of sentiment.

Support for greater immigration controls also is widespread in Africa, Asia and Latin America, without the generational differences seen in Europe and the United States. The principal exception is Japan, where older people are much more vehement than younger people that foreigners should face restrictions for entering their country. Fully 64% of Japanese ages 65 and older say there should be more control over foreign immigration. Only 12% of those ages 18-29 agree.

Most Agree English is Important

While most citizens of the world long to preserve their own national identities and to protect their cultures from foreign influence, majorities everywhere agree on the importance of children learning English or, in the case of the U.S. and Britain, on the necessity for children to learn a foreign language.

Generational differences on language training suggest that, while older Americans and Western Europeans are quite worried about foreign threats to their way of life, they still place great value on developing the language skills necessary to cope with the broader world. Fully 42% of US senior citizens completely agree that children need to learn a foreign language. Only 29% of those under the age of 30 feel that strongly about language training. In France, 68% of those ages 65 and older completely agree that kids need to learn English to succeed in the world today. Only 44% of those ages 18-29 feel that strongly. The age gap is equally wide in Britain and less pronounced in Germany and Italy.

In Eastern Europe, the generational difference on this issue runs in the opposite direction. Young people are much more strongly committed to the idea of learning English than the older generation. Overall, 53% of Eastern Europeans under the age of 30 completely agree that children need to learn English to succeed in the world today. Only 29% of those ages 65 and older feel the same way.

In Latin America, overwhelming majorities of all ages agree about the importance of learning English. Only in Mexico do young people place much greater value on language training than do their elders. In Asia, there is similarly widespread agreement among all age groups about the need to learn English. The lone exception is Japan, where 75% of those ages 65 and older completely agree that it is important for kids to learn English, while only 45% of those ages 18-29 completely agree.

¹ This also is true in the Asian countries surveyed by the Global Attitudes Project but not aggregated for the accompanying table or for this analysis.
² The World Values Survey, run out of University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, can be found online at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

A multinational survey conducted in association with the International Herald Tribune and Council on Foreign Relations

Europeans have a better opinion of President George W. Bush than they did before the Sept. 11 attacks, but they remain highly critical of the president, most of his policies, and what they see as his unilateral approach to international affairs. There also is a wide gap between the United States and Europe over the conflict in the Middle East, although recent U.S. efforts to forge a settlement there win broad European support.

Americans, who are generally sympathetic to the Israelis, approve of the overall U.S. approach toward the Middle East. In contrast, people in three of four major western European nations — France, Germany and Italy — have been mostly critical of U.S. policies in the region, with the British public split on this question. Many more Europeans than Americans express sympathy for the Palestinians, and this is especially the case among well-educated Europeans.

There are gaps of opinion over other U.S. policies as well. The president’s decision to impose tariffs on imports of foreign steel is condemned in Europe, but generally favored in the United States, at least by Americans who have an opinion on this issue. On the other hand, Europeans express overwhelming support for the president’s decision to increase American aid to poor countries, while a much more modest majority of Americans (52%) approve of this action. But in light of the U.S. public’s traditional opposition to foreign aid, it is noteworthy that a majority would support any aid increase.

The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan enjoys strong approval among the publics of the four countries, and most believe that the United States is not overreacting to the threat of terrorism. Even so, large majorities in each country think the U.S. is not taking allied interests into account in conducting the war, and Bush’s “axis of evil” rhetoric elicited a strongly negative reaction in France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain.

The survey of 4,042 people in the four countries (along with 1,362 Americans), conducted April 2-10 by the Pew Research Center in association with the International Herald Tribune and the Council on Foreign Relations, finds major transatlantic differences over possible military action to end Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq. In the United States, 69% favor military action, compared with 46% in Great Britain and France and even fewer (34%) in Germany and Italy. However, the survey does show European publics potentially responsive to the idea of using force against Iraq if it is established that Baghdad is developing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Evidence of Iraqi involvement in the Sept.11 attacks also would be very important to a majority in Great Britain, but fewer in France, Germany, or Italy.

The survey revealed considerable European support for taking a more independent course in security and diplomatic affairs. Majorities in France, Germany and Italy think western Europe’s partnership with the United States should not be as close as it has been in the past. People in Great Britain are divided on the question. European support for a more independent approach is not especially linked to negative reactions to recent U.S. policies, such as the steel tariffs. Rather, it is more associated with general criticism of President Bush, the feeling that the United States has ignored allied interests in conducting the war on terrorism, and general disapproval of U.S. policies in the Middle East.

George W. Bush is highly unpopular with the publics of the major nations of Western Europe. By wide margins, people in Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy all disapprove of his handling of international policy, and the American president does not inspire much more confidence in these countries than does Russian President Vladimir Putin.

More than seven-in-ten of those in each country say Bush makes decisions based entirely on U.S. interests, and most think he understands less about Europe than other American presidents. In that regard, Bush’s foreign policy approval rating runs 40-60 percentage points below former President Bill Clinton’s, when judged in retrospect.

These are the principal findings of a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, in a unique partnership with the International Herald Tribune and in association with the Council on Foreign Relations. Nearly 4,000 adults in four major European nations were polled. Respondents in the four nations ­ France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain ­ were fairly consistent in their appraisals of Bush, and there were few notable differences among major demographic groups.

In addition to the European survey, a subset of questions was asked in a nationwide U.S. poll of 1,277 adults. This survey found a 45%-32% plurality approving of the way Bush is handling foreign policy, only slightly below his overall job approval rating (50%-32%).

At the same time, Americans on balance disapprove of Bush’s decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (44%-29%). However, Americans were not nearly as opposed to this decision as Europeans, who disagree with Bush’s stance by approximately an eight-to-one margin.

Some of Bush’s positions win broad acceptance in Europe. Majorities in all four nations agree with his support of free trade, and Bush’s decision to maintain U.S. forces in Kosovo is actually more popular with Europeans than it is with Americans. But on the issues that have stirred the most controversy on his recent visits to Europe ­ Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto pact and his vow to go ahead with a missile defense plan even if that means withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty ­ Europeans come down firmly against the president.

By better than eight-to-one (83%-10%), Germans disapprove of Bush’s plan to develop a missile defense program if it means abandoning the ABM pact. The opposition to Bush’s stance is nearly as large in France, Italy and Great Britain. Americans, who have consistently backed development of a missile defense system in principle, are evenly divided (42% opposed, 39% in favor) when the possibility of withdrawing from the ABM treaty is mentioned.¹

Significantly, the sharp rejection of Bush and his key policies in Europe has not opened a more fundamental divide among the allies. If there is a bright light in the poll results for US-European relations, it is that most reject the idea that the U.S. and Europe are drifting apart. Only about one-in-five in all four countries see a broader rift developing, and sizable minorities in Germany (40%) and Italy (34%) see a growing coalescence of U.S. and European interests.

Little Confidence

Not only do most Europeans oppose key elements of Bush’s foreign policy, they express little confidence in the president. Indeed, only 20% of the French respondents and somewhat higher proportions of British (30%) and Italians (33%) say they have even a fair amount of confidence in Bush’s handling of world affairs. Germans, who tend to express more confidence in all the leaders tested, give Bush better marks, with about half (51%) voicing at least some confidence in his abilities.

Surprisingly, Europeans express only slightly more confidence in Bush than they do in Putin. Just 14% of the French and about a quarter of the Italians and British (23% and 26%, respectively) voice much confidence in the Russian leader, as do 41% of the Germans. Understandably, Europeans have much more confidence in their own national leaders than in either the Russian or American leader. The confidence ratings range from a high of 78% in Germany for Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to 53% in Italy for Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

Policy Divide

Clearly, the deep policy differences between the Bush administration and Europe are a major factor in the lack of confidence Europeans express in the president. And Bush’s decision to abandon the Kyoto protocol draws the most intense opposition among Europeans. Just one-in-ten British, French and Germans, and 12% of Italians, back Bush’s decision.

There is more division over this issue in the United States. Although a 44% plurality opposes Bush’s policy, many more Americans than Europeans (29%) back the president on this issue. Underscoring the higher level of interest in the Kyoto matter in Europe than the United States, relatively few respondents in Europe declined to answer this question; better than one-quarter of Americans had no opinion or declined to respond.

Europeans are somewhat less opposed to Bush’s stance on missile defense and the ABM treaty. Only 10% of Germans and 14% of the French back Bush, while slightly more people support the president’s position in Great Britain (20%) and Italy (24%). Americans are evenly divided, with 39% in favor of the president’s position and 42% opposed.

Bush’s policies on the Balkans and free trade win broad favor among the Europeans. Publics in all four European nations strongly back Bush’s decision to maintain U.S. troops in the multinational peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo, with the policy drawing weakest support in Italy (54% approve 33% disapprove). Americans also support this policy, but by a relatively narrow margin (47%-38%).

Bush’s backing for free trade is also popular, with about two-thirds of the British and German respondents supporting the president on this matter. The Italians and French are less supportive, with fewer than six-in-ten approving of Bush’s approach on trade.

While the president’s support for the death penalty in the United States was roundly criticized during his recent visits to Europe, he finds modest support for his position in Great Britain. There is broad opposition to the death penalty in France, Germany and Italy, but the British are split over Bush’s backing of capital punishment.

Still Much in Common

A solid majority of Europeans believe that, whatever their view of Bush, the United States and Europe have not grown apart in recent years. Germans and Italians were most likely to see more common ground among the allies, but even among the British and French fewer than a quarter (24% and 20% respectively) believe differences between the United States and Europe have widened.

Those who see trans-Atlantic differences as increasing do not attribute the rift to any single factor. Rather, solid majorities in this group point to the growing power of the European Union, the resentment stirred by U.S. multinationals, the lack of a common security threat, and differences over culture as reasons for a growing gap between the United States and Europe.

In a comparative media survey across eight countries, the publics of North America and Western Europe credit the news media for its positive overall impact on their countries. Large majorities said the press helps their democracies and has a good influence on their societies — usually better than the influence of other institutions, including even the churches in most cases.

As their standard of living goes from bad to worse and uncertainty about the future increases, the Russian people have soured on democracy.

By a margin of 51% to 31% Russians say they now favor a strong leader, rather than a democratic form of government to solve their country’s problems.  Only 17 months ago, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, a comparable Times Mirror Center poll found just the opposite division of opinion – 39% of Russians favored a strong hand at the helm and 51% wanted a democratic solution to their nation’s daunting problems.

The slide toward authoritarianism, in a nuclear-armed nation that remains potentially the most dangerous to the United States, is manifested in a number of ways in the survey and in a series of focus groups conducted throughout European Russia in November.   The polling found a growing disillusionment with the Russian parliament, declining interest in politics and no signs that the people feel increased political empowerment in post Soviet Russia.